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1998 Bankruptcy judges and Bankruptcy Venue I 
BANKRUPTCY JUDGES AND BANKRUPTCY VENUE: 
SOME THOUGHTS ON DELAWARE 
David A. Skeel, ] r. * 
I NT RODUCTIO N 
Delaware's recent rise to prominence as the bankruptcy venue of  choice for many 
large debtors has been dogged by increasing controversy. Cri tics note that firms that file 
for bankruptcy in Delaware often are domiciled there but have no other significant pres­
ence in the state . 1  They also complain that Delaware's bankruptcy judges are so interested 
in attracting prominent reorganizations to Delaware that they will take only debtors' 
. . 
mterests mro account. 
Interestingly, Delaware's bankruptcy court is not the fi rst to come under fire in 
recent years. In  the late 1980s and early 1 990s, numerous publicly held corporations filed 
their bankruptcy petitions in the Southern District of New York, many managing to do 
so through a jurisdictional sleight-of-hand. 
For much of this time, Delaware was largely off the bankruptcy map. But since 
the early 1 990s, Delaware has rivaled and in some respects surpassed New York as the 
venue of choice for large debtors. Although many of the complaints about venue-shop­
ping have both Delaware and New York in mind, the most vigorous recent criticism has 
been directed at Delaware's bankruptcy judges . The criticism is not simply academic. In 
early 1997, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission proposed that state of incor-
Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; Associate Professor 
of Law, Temple University. 
1. A note on terminology. I will use "domicile" and "state of incorporation" inter-
changeably throughout rhe article. As we will see, there has occasionally been some question as to 
whether a corporation's stare of incorporation is irs domicile, bur courts in recent decades have 
consisrenrly equated rhe rwo. 
Under the existing venue provision , 12 U.S.C.  § 1408 (1994) , a debtor may file for 
bankruptcy in any district where irs principal p lace of business, principal assets or domicile is ,  or  
where an affil iate has filed. It is the third of these options, domicile, that has prompted the recent 
controversy about Delaware and which is rhe subject of this article .  
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poration be eliminated as a basis for venue. 2 I f  passed, the reform would essentially elimi­
nate Delaware from the corporate bankruptcy picture, since relatively few firms have 
headquarters or substantial assets in Delaware. 
The purpose of this article is to consider both the merits of the Delaware venue 
controversy - is Delaware venue a good or a bad thing?- and the question whether the 
reform is likely to succeed. In doing so, I will emphasize two perspectives that are almost 
entirely lacking in the existing debate. First, both proponents and critics of Delaware 
venue have failed to fully consider the relationship between Delaware's rise to promi­
nence in bankruptcy and its role in corporate law generally. Commentators sometimes 
recognize Delaware's preeminence in corporate law, but they almost invariably treat 
Delaware's recent popularity as a bankruptcy venue choice as raising entirely differenc 
issues. In  fact ,  the two are integrally related . Specifically, just as the efforts of  Delaware 
and other states to attract corporations - a process often referred to as "charter competi-
2 .  See, e.g. , Marvin Krasny & Kevin J .  Carey, Editors Reply to an Anonymous Letter; 
Why is Delaware the Venue of Choice for Philadelphia-Based Companies?, The Legal lnrelligencer, 
March 22, 1 996, at 9 (proposal agreed ro in February, 1 997) . The National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission (hereinafter, rhe "Review Commission" or "Commission") was established by the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1 994 and instructed ro conduct an exhaustive investigation of bank­
ruptcy. The Review Commission delivered i rs reporrs, together with a long list of proposed re­
forms, in October, 1 997. 
Although the Review Commission's discussions attracted widespread attention from 
practitioners and elicited a lengthy defense of Delaware by the Delaware bar, see Report of the 
Delaware State Bar Association ro the National Bankruptcy Review Commission in Support of 
Maintaining Existing Venue Choices (Sept. 30 ,  1 996) (copy on file with author) (hereinafter Dela­
ware Report) , the issue first catapulted into the popular media when the Chief Judge of the Federal 
District Court of Delaware, Judge Farnan, withdrew the standing order referring all bankruptcy 
reorganization cases ro the bankruptcy judges in late January, 1 997. See, e.g., Ann Davis, Bankmptcy's 
Main Court Faces Limit, Wall St. J . ,  Jan. 27, 1 997, at A3 ("highly unusual " withdrawal of reference 
"stunned bankruptcy lawyers" ) ;  Ann Davis, Delaware Bankruptcy Court is Target for ALLeged Bias 
Favoring Companies, Wall St. J . ,  Jan . 28 ,  1 997, at B2 (describing withdrawal order and p roposal by 
Review Commission ro eliminate domicile-based venue) ; Delaware District Court Withdraws Reftr­
ence of ALL Ch. 11 Cases to Bankruptcy Court, Bankr. L. Rep. ,  Jan. 30, 1 997, at 1 23 (quoting with­
drawal order) ; Del District Court Clarifies Order Withdrawing Reftrence ofCh. 11 Cases, Bankr. L. 
Rep .. Feb. 6, 1 997,  at 1 64 (quoting revised order). The order, and a subsequent o rder clarifying the 
first ,  made clear Judge Farnan's intention ro scrutinize Delaware's reorganization cases . I discuss 
the significance of this action in Part I I ,  infra. 
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tion"- has induced Delaware to regulate corporate law in a generally efficient manner,3 
the same forces will have a beneficial effect on Delaware's bankruptcy judges.4 
To be sure, the beneficial effects of charter competition are attenuated in the 
bankruptcy context. I am reminded of a recent Hertz rental car commercial, where a 
hapless businessman is repeatedly asked if the inferior rental car company he has selected 
offers the same services as Hertz, and he is forced on each occasion to answer, "not ex­
actly." Because Congress, rather than the states, regulates bankruptcy, and bankruptcy 
judges are federal, state charter competition in bankruptcy is "not exactly" the same as it 
is in corporate law generally.5 Yet ,  because bankruptcy is so closely l inked to other aspects 
of corporate law, charter competition does influence the Delaware bankruptcy court. 
Because of this, Delaware venue should be encouraged rather than thwarted. 
Second, the article offers a detailed historical perspective on the venue contro­
versy. In contrast to most existing analyses, nearly all of  which have considered only the 
3. I should note that this statement is a contentious one. Commentators have long 
debated whether charter competition has beneficial or perverse effects. Most famously, William 
Cary argued in 1 97 4 that charter competition produces a "race to the bottom, "  with states enact­
ing unconscionably manager-friendly laws in order to attract corporations.  William L. Cary, Fed­
eralism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J . 663 ( 1 974) . Ralph Winter 
rejoined, with a position now described as the "race to the top" view, that market pressures force 
managers to seek and states to supply efficient regulation. Ralph K. Winte r, State Law, Shareholder 
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation ,  6 J .  Legal Stud. 2 5 1  ( 1977) . Most current commen­
tators take an intermediate view. I have described and defended my own perspective, an interme­
diate view tending toward the race to the top perspective, in David A. Skeel, ] r. , Rethinking the 
Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 4 7 1  ( 1 994) .  
4 .  A recent exception to commentators' neglect of the nexus between bankruptcy 
venue and corporate law is Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas ,  Improving Corporate 
Bankruptcy Law Through Venue Reform (I 997) (unpublished manuscr ipt, on file with author). 
Rasmussen and Thomas address several of the issues noted in this paragraph, agreeing with much 
of the analysis but critiquing the ultimate proposal I made in Rethinking the Line, supra note 3 .  
Although their article was completed too recently for me to give i t  the attention i t  deserves, I do  
discuss their conclusions briefly in Part I I (F) , infra. 
5. To assure all of the benefits of charter competi tion, Congress would need to relin-
quish control over corporate bankruptcy to the states. I have argued elsewhere that Congress should 
do precisely this, and that there is surprisingly strong historical support for state regulat.ion of 
corporate bankruptcy. Skeel, supra note 3 .  See also infra Parr II (A). 
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recent debate, I show that the current controversy has a long historical pedigree .6 I focus 
in particular on a series of debates during the 1 930s as to whether firms should be permi t­
red to fi le bankruptcy petitions in their state of  incorporation. Then, as now, everyone 
knew that rhe debate was really about Delaware; and the arguments for el iminating do­
micile-based venue were quire similar to those being made today. 
Nor only does the historical analysis underscore the connection between Dela­
ware venue and Delaware's role in corporate law generally, but it also provides important 
insights into the political question of whether venue reform is l ikely to be adopted. In the 
1 930s, Delaware initially protected but then lost domicile-based venue. My analysis of 
these events suggests both that Delaware's role in corporate reorganization was precarious 
and that the key factor in its initial victory was a well-p laced senator. Interestingly, there 
are striking echoes of both of these factors today, and it seems likely that only a well­
placed legislator - which Delaware currently has in Senator Joseph Biden - can pre­
empt reform. 
While my analysis focuses on the Delaware venue controversy, i t  is important to 
keep a larger picture in mind. At bottom, the venue controversy concerns the quality and 
efficacy of bankruptcy judges. From this perspective, my defense of Delaware venue is a 
contention that the desire to attract high-profile debtors will have a desirable effect on 
Delaware's bankruptcy j udges (and on who is selected to serve as a bankruptcy j udge in 
Delaware) . 
But preserving domicile-based venue is only one way - and a somewhat lim­
ired one at that - to enhance judges' performance . I discuss two alternative venue re­
forms, each of which could improve on the existing regime, at the end o f  Part II. A 
different, and still more sweeping, tack might be to alter rhe judicial selection process. 
G iving bankruptcy creditors a direct say in the selection process, for instance, might 
improve judges' incentive to focus on rhe efficiency of the reorganization process .7 Fi-
G. The one commentary that does include a historical analysis is the report prepared 
by the Delaware State Bar Association. Delaware Report, supra note 2. Because the report considers 
only a small piece of bankruptcy venue history- the treatment of venue in the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898 - i t  presents an incomplete and somewhat misleading picture. 
7 .  Professor George Triantis and I are developing and defending j ust such an approach 
in a current work- in-progress. 
· 
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nally, and to take quite a different perspective, it may be that the centrali ty of bankruptcy 
judges will decline as the parties make effortS themselves to improve the bankruptcy pro­
cess.x 
Nevertheless, even if Delaware venue is only one piece of the puzzle, I hope to 
show in this article that it is a very promising piece and that it would be a great mistake to 
thwart bankruptcy filings in Delaware. 
The article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I provide the historical context for the 
current venue controversy, focusing in particular on legislative debates over domicile­
based venue in the early and late 1 930s. In Part I I ,  I consider the normative question 
whether Delaware firms should be entitled to file for bankruptcy in Delaware. In defend­
ing Delaware venue, I discuss in some detail the connection between the Delaware bank­
ruptcy court and Delaware's preeminence in corporate law. I then turn in Part I I I  to the 
political question, which I will consider in "public choice" terms, of whatever venue re­
form designed to eliminate Delaware venue is likely ro succeed. 
I. BACK TO THE FUTURE : A B RIEF HISTO RY O F  
BA NKRUPTCYVE NUE CO NCE R NS 
As i f  to confirm the old adage that there is nothing new under the sun, the 
treatment of venue issues in bankruptcy has followed a curious pattern :  long periods 
during which venue concerns remain in the background are periodically interrupted by 
intense fights about venue. Rather than a new set of issues, the current debate about 
venue - and in particular, debtors' desire to fi le for bankruptcy in Delaware - raises 
many of the same issues that were vigorously debated in connection with the New Deal 
bankruptcy reforms. 
The purpose of this part is to give a brief but thorough history of bankruptcy 
venue, with a particular emphasis on the current and New Deal concerns about Delaware 
as the forum of choice for many large debtors. In addition to placing the current debate 
in historical perspective, the analysis will provide important insights as to both the merits 
of the debate and the question of whether Delaware can thwart the effort to eliminate 
state of incorporation as a venue option. 
8. The increasing use of "emergence bonuses" in large cases is a fascinating examp le of 
such a step. An emergence bonus is a commitment by creditors to pay a debtor's managers a bonus 
if they confirm a reorganization quickly. Such a bonus cleverly counteracts the incentive managers 
otherwise have, particularly if  they continue to focus on shareholders' interests , to delay the bank­
ruptcy process. 
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A. E arly History: E quity Receiverships 
and the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 
Volume 1:1 
Like American bankruptcy itself, the venue issue has an oddly b ifurcated his­
tory, due to the fact that large corporate debtors rarely invoked the bankruptcy laws until 
Congress added a corporate reorganization provision in the 1 930s.9 Rather than bank­
ruptcy, large debtors reorganized through an equity receivership process first used to re­
structure troubled rai lroads in the nineteenth century. 10 As a result, there actually were 
two relevant sources of venue doctrine: the Bankruptcy Act of 1 898 and courts' decisions 
on ven ue in equity receivership cases . 1 1  
The Bankruptcy Act's venue provision, section 2a, had provided since the Act's 
enactment in 1 89 8  that venue was proper wherever a "person" had "their principal place 
of business, resided, or had their domicile . . .  for the preceding six months .  "12 Because 
9. The Bankruptcy Act of 1 898, America's first permanent bankruptcy law, included 
only two disposi tion options: liquidation and composition. Although the composition procedure 
was a simplified form of reorganization, it prohibited a debtor from altering its secured obliga­
tions. For t hi s  and other reasons, corporate debtors rarely filed for bankruptcy except to liquidate. 
For a succinct description of the reasons corporate debtors avoided the Bankruptcy Act, see Henry 
J. Friend ly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations Act, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 39, 41 -48 ( 1 934) .  
1 0 . The equity receivership process was developed, largely through t he ingenuity o f  r he 
corporate bar, from traditional state law foreclosure procedures. In the practice t hat evolved, firms 
would persuade a friendly our-of-state (in order to establish federal diversity jurisdiction) creditor 
to invoke t he foreclosure process. The firm's managers generally would be appointed as receiver, i t s  
underwriters would form "protective committees" to  assure the support of i rs  bondho lders, and 
rhe firm would be "sold" to irs existing creditors. For a widely-cited overview of t hi s  p rocess see 
Pau l  D .  Cravarh, Reorganization of Corporations, in Some Legal Phases of Corporate Financing, 
Reorgani zation and Regulation 15 3 ( 1 9 17) . I describe t he emergence of American corporate reor­
gan ization t hrough t he equity receiverships in greater derai l in David A. Skeel, Jr . ,  An Evolution­
ary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy 40- 47 ( 1 997) (unpubli shed manuscript, 
on file with author) . 
11 . The principal limitation of t he otherwise helpful  hi storical account given in Dela­
ware Report, supra note 2, is that it considers only t he first of these sources, § 2a of t he 1 89 8  Act. 
Much of t he debate in the 1930s centered on the treatment of venue i ssues in equity receivership s, 
due to t he fact t hat this was how corporat ions were actually reorganized p rior to the codification of 
reorganization in 1 93 4. 
12. 11 U.S .C. § 1 la(l) (repealed 197 8) .  
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corporations were treated as " persons" and courts construed "domicile" to mean stare of 
incorporation, corporate debtors could file for bankruptcy in their state of incorporation 
under the 1898 Act. 13 This provision had little significance for corporate debtors until 
much later, 14 however, because large corporations rarely invoked the Act's liquidation­
oriented provisions. 
What mattered much more w a corporate debtor was courts' treatment of the 
ven ue issue in an equity receivership. As noted above, an equity receivership was simply a 
stare law foreclosure action ini tiated by a secured creditor when a corporate debwr de­
faulted on its obligations. 15 Despite the state law basis, many (and in rime, most) debtors 
obtained federal j urisdiction by encouraging a friendly our-of-stare creditor to commence 
rhe receivership.  16 Not infrequently, questions arose as w where venue could properly lie 
for these actions. 
In rime, courts developed several differen t approaches to the venue issue. Rea­
soning that a "person" can have only one domicile, and that a firm's domicile is irs stare of 
incorporation, some courts concluded that the stare of incorporation was the only proper 
venue for a firm's equity receivership. 17 A few courts reached precisely the opposite con­
clusion, holding that venue should follow a firm's assets or principal place of business, nor 
i rs state of incorporation. I X  As often is the case, a majority of courts adopted an interme-
1 3 . See generally Note, Venue Under the Chandler Bill in Corporate Bankruptcy and Reor­
ganization Proceedings, 5 U. Chi. L. Rev. 272 ( 1 938) (describing§ 2a of existing Act) . 
1 4. As we wil l see, § 2a became relevant after the 1 93 8  reforms, because large debtors 
increasingly evaded Chapter X, which was designed to be the principal chapter for regulating the 
reorganization of publicly held debtors . Section 2a applied to Chapter XI, the chapter these firms 
sought to invoke. 
15 . See supra note 1 0 . 
1 6 . An important exception, as we shall see, is that many firms invoked the state chan­
cery system in Delaware. 
1 7. See David M. Wright, Note, jurisdiction and Venue in Federal Equity Receivership of 
Corporations, 23 Va. L. Rev. 29, 30-3 1 ( 1 937) (citing Maguire v. The Mortgage Co . ,  203 F. 85 8 
(2d Cir. 1 9 1 3) ) .  
18. !d. a t  3 4  (citing Primos Chemical Company v. Fulton Sueer, 24 F. 45 4 (N. D.N.Y. 
1 9 1 8) ) .  
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diate position, and made a facc�based determinacion whether venue was p roper in a par­
ticular location. The most frequently s tated concern was the convenience of the chosen 
forum for the parties in the case. 19 
Even in these early years o f  corporate reorganization, Delaware had a significant 
and widely known stake in courts' conclusions about venue. By 1 920, Delaware had 
displaced New Jersey as the leading state o f  incorporation for publicly held corporations. 
Although most commentators think only of Delaware's role in corporate governance is­
sues, Delaware's p rimacy also extended to corporate reorganization. Chancellor Wolcott 
in particular was well-known for his expert handling of equity receivership cases.20 Then, 
as now, the question whether venue should lie in the state of incorporation was really a 
question whether firms should be permitted to reorganize in Delaware. 
B .  Venue Reform in the New Deal 
The New Deal brought a complete transformation of corporate bankruptcy law. 
The transformation rook place in two very different steps. First, Congress codified the 
equity receivership process, adding a railroad receivership provision to the 1 898  Act in 
1933 and a similar provision for other corporations in 1 934. 21These initial reforms were 
1 9 .  !d. at 36-42.  Convenience to rhe parries has long been a central concern in bank­
ruptcy, and was seen by many as the principal flaw in the Bankruptcy Act of 1 867.  See, e.g. , 
Charles Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History 1 1 0 ( 1 935 ) .  The 1 89 8  Act included several 
provisions that imposed specific  limitations on how many miles a parry would be expected to 
travel. Similar concerns are at the heart of the current venue controversy, bur I argue in Part II that 
rhe concerns are nor well-founded given current technology and demographics. 
20 . Thus, in the hearings that eventually led to the codification of corporate reorgani ­
zation, one speaker referred explicitly to  the effect that including corporate bankruptcy in the 
Bankruptcy Act would have on Chancellor Wolcott's chancery court. joint Hearings on 5. 3866 
Before the Subcommittees on the judiciary, 72nd Cong. ,  1 st Sess. 570 ( 1 932) (hereinafter 1932 
Hearings) (statement of Max Isaac, Editor, American Bankruptcy Review) . See also William T. 
Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of Chancery, in Court of 
Chancery of the State of Delaware : 1 792- 1 992,  at 2 1 ,  37 ( 1 992) ( listing decis ion extending the 
statutory power to appoint a receiver as one of rhe eight most important corporate law decis ions by 
Chancellor Wolcott's p redecessor, Chancellor Charles M. Curtis) . 
2 1 .  Act of March 3 ,  1 933 , 47 Stat. 1 474 ( 1 933) ,  1 1  U .S .C.A. § 204 ( 1 933) ( repealed 
1 978) (§ 77, providing for rai lroad reorganization) ; Act of]une 7 ,  1 934, 48  Star. 9 1 2 , 1 1  U.S. C. A. 
§ 207 ( 1 934) ( repealed 1 938)  (§ 77B, providing for corporate reorganization) .  I discuss the legis­
lative history of Sections 77 and 77B in derail in Skee l, supra note 1 0 . 
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stop-gap measures , enacted in  haste in  response to the Depression. In  1 938  Congress 
passed a second reform, the Chandler Act, which rewrote both the corporate reorganiza­
t ion provision and much of the rest of the 1 898 Bankruptcy Act . 22 The venue question 
received a surprising amount of attention at each stage of the reform process . 
Let us begin with the initial codification of railroad and corporate reorganiza­
tion in  1 933 and 1934. As first introduced and passed by the House, Section 77, the 
railroad provision, provided for venue only in the state of a rail road's principal place of 
business or principal assets. 23 The init ial Senate vers ion of the bill went further and added 
domicile as another basis for venue. But domicile-based railroad reorganization was not 
to be. During the Senate deliberati ons, Senator La Follette proposed that domicile be 
stricken from the venue optionsY If  reorganization could be based on state of incorpora­
t ion, he argued, "we may find that a great many of the proceedings . . .  wil l  occur in  . . .  
[states] perhaps thousands of miles away from the territory in which [the rail roads] are 
operating and from the communi ties in which they have their principal operating of­
fices .  "25 
The floor manager- and principal expert- of the bil l  was Senator Hastings 
of Delaware. 2" Senator Hastings proposed that the Senate leave domicile in, with the 
expectation that the conference comm ittee would take a close l ook at the venue provision 
22. Act of June 22, 1 938 ,  52  Stat. 840,  11 U.S .  C. § 1 (1 938) (repealed 1 978) .  The 
Chandler Act was repealed in 1 978 ,  when Congress replaced the 1898 Act with the new Bank­
ruptcy Code. 
23. See, e.g. , 76 Con g. Rec. 511 1 ( Feb. 27, 1 933) (description of the House and Senate 
provisions on venue by Senator Hastings, floor manager and bill's principal proponent) . 
24 . Senator LaFollette was the son offamous Wi sconsin progressive Robert LaFollette, 
and was an important progressive in his own right. See, e. g. , Arthur Schleisinger, The Crisi s  of the 
Old Order 225-26 ( 1 9 5 5) .  
2 5 .  7 6  Cong. Rec. 5 1 1 1  (Feb. 27, 1 933) . 
26. Throughout the process, legislators frequently noted that the bill was passed so 
quickly that no one except Hastings fully understood its provisions. See, e. g. , 76 Cong. Rec. 4884 
(Feb. 24 , 1 933) (Senator Bratton, another member of the three-member bankruptcy subcommit­
tee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, complaining thar even he did not have sufficiem rime to 
understand the entire b i ll) . 
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while reconcil ing the House and Senate bills .  27 But Senator LaFol lette stood his ground, 
and the Senate approved his amendment deleting domicile from the ven ue provision.28 
Congress' treatment of venue followed a strikingly similar panern in 1934, when 
i t  added a corporate reorganization provision to the Bankruptcy Act.29 As with rail road 
reorganization,  the House version did not include domicile as a basis for venue, but the 
Senate version did.30 Once again ,  a senator, this time Senator Hugo Black of Alabama, 
argued that domicile-based reorganization would enable corporations to file for bank­
ruptcy in a state far from their  principal operations. The bil l  as wrinen,  he  contended, 
"would encourage a continuation of the conditions with reference to the freedom and 
laxness of corporate laws in certain states."31 
In response, Senator Hastings defended Delaware's role as a leading state of 
incorporation, and argued that corporations would file for bankruptcy in their  state of 
incorporation only if there were no  obvious location of their principal assets.32 After fur­
ther discussion, Senators Black and Hastings agreed to an amendment that would make 
this pol icy explicit, authorizing domicile-based filing only if the pri ncipal place of busi-
27. 76 Cong. Rec. 5 1 1 2  (Feb. 27, 1 93 3 ). 
28. !d. See also Max Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorganization Act, 47 H arv. L. Rev. 1 8, 
27 n .28 ( 1933)  (describing language as arising from the exchange between Senarors Hastings an d 
La Follette). 
29. The continued importance of Senator Hastings, a conservative Republican, as 
chronicled below, is particularly striking given that the Democrats were fi rm ly in control by 1934. 
30. Compare 77 Cong. Rec. 5009 (June 5 ,  1 93 3 )  (House version of bill, nor l isting 
domicile) with 77 Con g .  Rec. 7886 (May 2, 1 93 4) (Senate version, includes domicile). Interest­
ingly, the bil l  that was proposed as an outgrowth of the 1 93 2  Thacher Report, which in many 
respects was the wellspring of all of the subsequent reforms, had provided for domicile-based venue, 
consistent with the Bankruptcy Act's existing venue provision. See 1932 Hearings, supra note 20, at 
60-62 (annotated vers ion of §2(a) of proposed bill). See also note 1 3  and accompanying rexr, mpra 
(discussing § 2(a) of rhe Bankruptcy Act). 
3 1 .  77 Cong. Rec. 7890 (May 2, 1 93 4). Senator Black's comments reflect a deep skep­
ticism of the effects of charter competit ion, which he analogized to the states' apparent "race" ro 
liberalize divorce laws at that rime. 
3 2. !d. 
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ness or assets were "controvened."33 Interestingly, although the Senate agreed to this amend­
ment, the l imitation disappeared while the bill was in conference. As passed, the corpo­
rate reorganization provision was more generous on venue than ei ther the House or Sen­
ate had been- including state of incorporation as a venue option, with no strings at­
rached.34 
What are we to make of these developments? At a general level , it is clear that 
both sides in the venue debate saw domicile-based reorganization as an integral parr of 
the l arger controversy about Delaware's success in attracting corporations. There was, and 
continues ro be, a populist (and progressive) disdain for charter competit ion ,  since it 
appears to benefit our-of-state imerests at the expense of employees and the communities 
in which businesses are locared.35 It is therefore not surprising that the two senators who 
most visibly opposed domicile-based reorganization, Senators Black and La Follette, had 
populist (or, with La Follette, progressive) inclinations. 
Interestingly, the venue debates ran directly counter to the tradi tiona! public 
choice assumption that populist interests play most strongly in the Senate3r,- recall that 
33 .  The amendment added the fol lowing language after principal p lace of business 
and principal assets: "Or if the principal place of business or the place where the principal assets 
are located is controverted, then in the territorial jurisdiction in which it was incorporated: pro­
uided, that the court may, upon petition,  d i rect a transfer of such proceedings to any territorial 
jurisdiction where the corporat ion has a substantial  portion of its assets, if satisfied that the inter­
ests of all parties would be better subserved."  77 Cong. Rec. 7895 (May 2, 1934) .  
34 .  Act of June 7 ,  1 934 , 48 Stat. 91 2 ,  1 1  U.S .C.A. §77 B(a) (1 93 4) (repealed 1 938) .  
3 5 .  The populist disdain for charter compet i t ion has nor disappeared . It i s  n::>r acci­
dental that one of the leading proponents of federal izing corporate law in the 1970s was Ralph 
Nader. See Ralph Nader, Mark Green, & Joel Seligman, Taming The Giant Corporat ion ( 1  976). 
3 6. The rationale for this assumption is that small and less populous stares have greater 
influence in the Senate than the House, due to the fact that every state has the same number of 
senators. For an analysis of the legislati ve history of the 1 978 Bankruptcy Code that finds evi ­
dence confirming this intuit ion see Eric Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Act of 
1978, 96 M ich . L. Rev. 47 (1 997) . 
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on each occasion, the House rather than the Senate passed bills reflecting the populist 
position that domicile should be excluded .  The obvious explanation for this reversal of 
roles is the effect of a single, wel l-placed senator, Senator Hastings, whose s tatus as floor 
l eader and principal expert gave him particular influence over the outcome .37 
One smal l  puzzle remains, however: if Senator Hastings was so influential , why 
did only the corporate reorganization provision include domicile as a basis for venue? The 
l ikely explanation is that Delaware had little at stake in the railroad context. Unlike other 
corporations, m ost railroads did not incorporate in Delaware; and even those that did 
would general ly file for bankruptcy in the state where their most important assets were. 38 
Thus, it cost Hastings l ittle to concede on railroad reorganization, and the issue may have 
meant much m ore to populists, given the importance of railroads to many midwestern 
and western states . 
After the first set of New Deal reforms, then, state of incorporation was pre­
served as a venue option for corporate debtors. The success was to be short-lived, h ow­
ever. The 1933 and 1934 reforms proved, in a sense, to be simply  a pause in ongoing 
discussions aimed at a more pervasive rethinking of America's bankruptcy laws. In the 
mid-1930s, with increasing input from New Deal reformers such as Will iam Dougl as 
and the newly formed Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Congress considered 
37. Thus, while populist appeals (most visibly, those of Hugo B lack) figured promi­
nenrly in the Senate debate, Senator Hastings managed to preserve domicile-based venue for non­
railroad corporations. Hastings' success can be seen as anecdotal confirmation of  recent arguments 
as to the influence legislative committee mem bers have in the legislative process through. among 
other things. their prominence on the conference committees that resolve differences between 
House and Senate versions of a bill. See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional 
Foundations of Committee Power, 81 Am .  Pol. Sci. Rev. 8 5 (1 987) .  I discuss these political issues in 
more derail in Part I I I .  infra. 
It is interesting to note that Hastings' constituents were not uniformly thrilled with h is 
role in bankruptcy reform. Many Delaware lawyers would have preferred that things be left as they 
were - that is, that firms reorganize through the equity receivership process. See, e.g . •  77 Con g. 
Rec. 7891 (May 2, 1934) {statement of Sen. Hastings. noting Delaware lawyers' complaints to 
h im about the reform effort) . 
38. As Senator Hastings himself pointed out in h is debate with Senator Black. See supra 
note 32 and accompanying text. 
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the proposals that eventually became the Chandler Acr.39 The reformers were adamanr 
throughout the process about excluding state of incorporation from the venue options40 
(and in fact were hopeful of making far deeper inroads on charter competition by enact­
ing a federal incorporation statute) . 4 1  By the time of the principal Chandler Act hearings 
and legislative debate, Senator Hastings was no longer one of Delaware's senators. 42 With 
relatively l ittle opposition, the reformers succeeded in l imiting venue in Chapter X, the 
principal reorganization chapter for publ icly held corporations, to the state of a firm's 
principal place of business or assets . 4 3  
In  addition to restricting venue, Chapter X imposed strict governmental over­
sight on the reorganization process, displacing a debtor's managers with a trustee and 
giving broad advisory powers to the SEC.44 The overall effect of the reformers' handiwork 
was to sever the connections between corporate law and bankruptcy, and to diminish 
39 .  Under the Securit ies Exchange Act of 1 934 ,  the SEC had been charged with in ves­
tigating and preparing a report on the use of protective committees in the reorganization process. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1 9  34 ,  §§ 4, 2 1 1 ,  1 5  U .5. C. §§ 7 8d, 78 jj ( 1 9  34) . It was this report that 
landed rhe S EC squarely in rhe middle of the reform process .  For further discussion, see Skeel, 
supra note 1 0, at 60-67 . 
40. See, e.g. , Hearing on HR. 6439 Before the Committee on the judiciary, House of 
Representatives, 7 5th Cong. , 1 st Sess. 1 83 (1 937) (statement ofWilliam 0. Douglas, SEC Chair­
man) . Interestingly, the early versions of the Chandler Act, which predated the S EC's involvement 
an d were drafted largely by the National Bankruptcy Conference, also omitted state of incorpora­
tion from the venue options. See, e.g. , John Gerdes, Section 77B, The Chandler Bi/1 and Other 
Proposed Revisions, 3 5  M ich . L. Rev. 361 , 379 ( 1 937) (citing an d describing 1 93 6  version of b ill) . 
4 1 .  Joel Seligman provides a useful discussion of the unsuccessful  effortS to propose 
an d pass a federal incorporation stature in Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 205 -
1 0  (1 982) . 
42.  Senator Hastings lost his reelection b id in 1 93 6- a loss attributed by many to h is 
adamant opposition to the New Deal reforms. See, e.g. , Charles J .  Durante, Kingmakers, Nor 
Kings: 1 900- 1 939 ,  The Delaware Bar in The Twentieth Century 527, 534 ( Helen L. Winslow, et 
al. , eds . ,  1 994) (hereinafter Delaware Bar) . Delaware did have a Senator on the Senate Judiciary 
Committee during the late 1 93 0s ,  Senator James Hughes, but he, unlike Senator H astings, was 
not on the bankruptcy subcommittee and does not appear to have played a s ign ificant role. 
43 .  5 2  Stat. 840, 886, 1 1  U.S. C.A. § 1 28 ( 1 938) (repeal e d  1 97 8) .  
44 .  52  Stat. 840, 888, 1 1  U.S .C.A. § 1 5 6  ( 1 938) (repealed 1 97 8) .  See also Skeel, supra 
note 1 0, at 64- 65 (discussing mandatory trustee provision and the controversy it insp ired). 
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managers' incentives to invoke che reorganization process. Scares l ike Delaware could no 
longer atuact corporate reorganizations, since domicile was not a permissible basis for 
venue, and after the 1 930s, there were relatively few large-scale reorganizations in any 
event. The change in Delaware's role was quickly apparent in the Delaware chancery 
court. Whereas the chancery court previously had been well -known for its role both in 
corporate law and with receiverships, the court's expertise centered on corporate l aw alone 
after the 1 930s .  
C. Venue in the Post- New Deal Era 
As I have described in detail elsewhere, the post New Deal era was in many 
respects a transition period for bankruptcy. 45 The New Deal reforms crippled the elite 
bankruptcy bar, and corporations viewed Chapter X as an absolute l ast resort due to its 
draconian effect on managers . But the New Deal reforms contained the seeds of the 
developments chat eventually led both to the bankruptcy process we now have in Chapter  
1 1, and co renewed concerns about venue shopping. 
Crucial co subsequent developments was the fact that, although everyone knew 
Chapter X was designed for publicly held corporations, nothing in the Chandler  Act 
required that public firms choose this chapter rather than Chapter XI, which contained a 
somewhat expanded version of the traditional composition procedure.46 An increasing 
number of firms with outstanding issuances of public securities began filing under Chap­
ter XI, a strategy che Supreme Court vindicated in the mid-1950s. 47 In time, Chapter XI 
became the chapter of choice for publicly held corporations . 
45 .  The analysis of the next three paragraphs is drawn from the m ore detailed d iscus­
sion in Skeel, supra note 1 0. 
46. For a thoughtful discussion, see Eugene R. Rostow & Lloyd N .  Cutler, Competing 
Systems of Corporate Reorganization: Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 4 8  Yale L.J. 1 33 4  
( 1949). In contrast t o  Chapter X, which was almost entirely the SEC's handiwork, the S E C  played 
little role with Chapter XI or the remainder of the Chandler Act. The National Bankruptcy Con­
ference, which was comprised of bankruptcy lawyers and lawyers' organizations such as the ABA, 
was the driving force behind the changes in these other areas. 
47. General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 3 50 U.S. 4 62 (1 956) (holding that the choice 
between chapters depended on the "needs to be met" ) .  For further discussion, see David A. Skeel, 
Jr., supra note 1 0, at 7 1 -73 .  
1998 Bankruptcy judges and Bankruptcy Venue 15 
In addition to providing much more flexibility- most importantly, by permit­
ting a firm's existing managers to remain in control - Chapter Xl also al tered a firm's 
venue options . Rather than Chapter X's restrictive standard, firms that filed their petition 
under Chapter Xl were subject to the Bankruptcy Act's general venue provis ion.48 S ince 
the general standard l isted domicile as a basis for venue, just as it had prior to the New 
Deal reforms, a firm that invoked Chapter XI could file in its state of incorporation if i ts 
managers so chose. 
In 1973, the Bankruptcy Act's venue rules were consolidated in Rule 116(a) , 
which provided separate s tandards for individuals, partnerships, and corporations. The 
new rule, which was superseded with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1 978, 
included only principal place of business and principal assets as venue options . 
Given Delaware's status as the state of choice for publ icly held corporations, one 
might expect that when firms began to invoke Chapter XI, Delaware quickly became the 
fil ing location of choice. Yet even as of 1 973, few firms made a special effort to file in 
Delaware based on their status as a Delaware corporation. Why was this? 
Several factors seem to explain the relative l ack of Delaware fil ings . First, many 
of the firms that initially steered away from Chapter X and into Chapter Xl were medium­
sized rather than truly "publicly held" firms.49 Medium-sized firms often are centered in a 
single state and incorporated in that state. 50 At least early on, then, rel atively few of the 
firms using Chapter XI were l ikely to have been Delaware firms. By the 1 960s and early 
1970s this pattern had changed, however, as even the largest firms looked to Chapter XI 
-which suggests that other factors must also have been at work. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, bankruptcy lawyers s imply did not think 
to file in Delaware . Few bankruptcy lawyers were l ikely to have remembered Delaware's 
former status as an important reorganization venue, particularly given the near complete 
4 8. Bankruptcy Act §  2 a(l), 1 1  U.S .C. § lla(lO) (repealed 1 97 8). 
49 .  As Benjamin Weintraub and Harris Levin chronicled in a series of articles in the 
195 0s and early 1 960s. See, e.g., Benjamin Weintraub & Harris Levin ,  A SequeL to Chapter X or 
Chapter XI: Coexistence for the Middle-Sized Corporations, 26 Ford. L. Rev. 292 (19 5 7) .  
50 .  Delaware's preeminence in  corporate law is  a preeminence with respect to  publicly 
held corporations - 40% of which are incorporated in Delaware. For smaller corporations, it 
generally is cheaper and more convenient to incorporate in the state where the firm is located. See, 
e.g. , William L. Cary & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on Corporations 1 25 (7th ed. 
1 995 ) .  
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separation between the practice of corporate law and bankruptcy practice.  5 1 The  law firms 
that encouraged their large corporate clients to incorporate in Delaware were no longer 
the same firms that steered troubled firms through bankruptcy. Moreover, Delaware's 
judges themselves could no longer claim any particular expertise in reorganization law. 
Firms did engage in varying degrees of forum shopping, of course, but they generally did 
not view Delaware as an important optionY 
Together, these factors seem to have kept Delaware out of the l imelight. Each 
was to change in important respects after the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1 978 . 
D. The 1978 Bankruptcy Code and Thereafter 
The 1 978 Bankruptcy Code brought sweeping changes to bankruptcy law, sev­
eral of which made reorganization much more palatable to the managers of troubled 
firms. In addition to combining Chapters X and XI of the old Act into a single reorgani­
zation chapter, Chapter 1 1 , the Code adopted a presumption that a debtor's managers 
would remain in charge during bankruptcy,53 and all but eliminated SEC oversight .  The 
drafters were quite clear that they intended for Chapter 1 1  to encourage rather than 
discourage reorganization,  based on their view that troubled firms often are worth more 
as going concerns than in piecemeal liquidation.  
In connection with their pervasive revision of the bankruptcy laws, the drafters 
also adopted a new venue provision. The new provision once again included state of 
incorporation as a permissible basis for venue, and also stated that a firm may file in any 
5 1 .  For further discussion of the separation, see Skeel, supra note 1 0 , at 66 .  
52 .  Notice that this offers a striking illustration of the effect institutions have on actors' 
(here, managers' and their lawyers') perception of available options. The most prominent exponent 
of this institutional perspective on economic history has been Douglass North. See Douglass C. 
North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance ( 1 99 1 ) .  My own view, as 
wil l  become clear, i s  that these limitations play an important role, but the adaptive process gener­
ally tends toward efficiency in a context such as American corporate law and corporate bankruptcy. 
53 .  The presumption of managerial control arises from Bankruptcy Code§ 1 1 0 1 ,  which 
defines the "debtor-in-possession," and Bankruptcy Code § 1 1 07 ,  which gives the debtor-in-pos­
session all of the powers of a trustee (and in  doing so, implies that existing managers will not be 
replaced by a trustee under ordinary circumstances) . 
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jurisdiction where an affiliate has filed. 54 The provision was enacted with relatively l ittle 
fanfare,55 but its terms l ie at the heart of the recent firestorm of protest about venue 
shopping in bankruptcy. 
As increasing numbers of publicly held corporations filed Chapter 1 1  petitions 
in the 1980s, choice of forum began to play a prominent role in the bankruptcy decision. 
The clear venue of choice for these corporations was the Southern District of New York. 56 
Although some of the firms had a substantial presence in New York, others made use of 
the broad flexibil ity built into the venue provision; Eastern Airlines, for instance, used 
the filing of a relatively minor affiliate to establish venue for the much larger core firm .  57 
Skeptics of these tactics argued that managers headed to New York to take advantage of 
its manager-friendly posrure on issues such as extending the so-called "exclusivity pe­
riod,"5g while defenders emphasized the value of the judges' sophistication in particularly 
complex reorganizations. 
54 .  The new, and currenr, provision permits a case to be filed in the district: 
( 1 )  in which the domicile, residence, principal place of business in the 
United States, or principal assets in the United States, of the person or entity 
that is the subject of such case have been located for the one hundred and 
eighty days immediately preceding such commencement, or for a longer por­
tion of such one-hundred-and-eighty-day period than the domicile, residence, 
or principal place of business, in the United States, or principal assets in  the 
United States, of such person were located in any other district; or 
(2) in which there is a pending case under tide I I  concerning such person's 
affil iate, general partner, or partnership. 
28 u.s.c. § 1 408 ( 1 994) .  
55 .  This is not to say rhe venue provision passed without comment. During the hear­
ings, a few speakers worried that the provision gave debtors too many venue options, and as a 
result would permit venue shopping. 
56. See, e.g. , Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shop­
ping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large. Publicly Held Companies, 1 99 1  Wise. L. Rev. 1 1 , 1 5  
( 1 99 1 ) .  
57.  !d. at 22. See also id. at  27 (Johns Manville filed for bankruptcy in New York de­
spite having no substanrial assets there) . 
5 8. See Bankruptcy Code § 1 1 2 1  (debtor-in-possession has exclusive right to propose 
reorganization plan for first 1 20 days of case, and longer if extended). 
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Interestingly, Delaware p layed li ttle role in managers' thinking during the  1 9 80s,  
and it was something of an accident chat first brought Delaware to prominence. The firm 
that put Delaware back on the map was Continental . According to widely repeated ru­
mor, when Continental was considering its second bankruptcy filing in  1 990 ,  i ts manag­
ers wanted to file either in New Yo rk or Atlanta. Because neither of these locations was 
viable, the managers debated other possible choices on the eastern seaboard, and through 
a process of elimination seeded on Delaware . In the wake of Continental's remarkably 
smooth reorganization,  other publ icly held corporations followed suit . 59 And the rest ,  as 
they say, is history. 
Even more than with the Southern District of New York, Delaware's emergence 
as a venue of choice has provoked loud criticism, with striking echoes of the criticisms 
made by Senator La Follette, Senator Black, and other reformers in the 1 93 0s.  Earl ier this 
year, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, which has just completed an exten­
sive new study of the bankruptcy system, made the criticism of Delaware (and to a lesser 
extent, New York) concrete by proposing that the Code's venue provision be amended to 
elim inate both state of incorporat ion and affil iate fil ing as bases for ven ue.60 In effect, the 
new proposal ,  which was formally approved by the Commission,  advocates a return to 
rhe New Deal reformers' approach in Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act .  
Shortly after the Commission approved the  proposed amendment, in  a move 
chat many commentators saw as connected in some way to the venue debate, Judge Farnan , 
the chief j udge of the District Court in Delaware, withdrew the standing order that auto­
matically refers bankruptcy cases to Delaware's two bankruptcy judges . r >�  Consistent with 
his announced concerns about the burgeoning bankruptcy caseload in  D elaware , Judge 
59 .  For a general discussion of the Continental fil ing and its role in Delaware's rise to 
prominence, see Mark D. Coll ins,  Why Delaware? ,  Del. Law. , Fall, 1 997, at 38 .  
60 .  In  doing so ,  the Comm ission adopted the recommendations of  a memo prepared 
by Larry King and Elizabeth Holland. Memorandum from Larry P. King & Elizabeth I. Holland 
to National Bankruptcy Review Comm ission (Nov. 1 9 , 1 996) (on file  with author) . 
61. See supra note 2 (describing the orders) .  The standing order is an artifact of the 
awkward relationship between bankruptcy judges and the district court. Because bankruptcy j udges 
do not have Article I I I  status, the federal d istrict court technically oversees bankruptcy cases. Each 
district's standing order delegates this authority, for the most part, to the bankruptcy judges in a 
district. By withdrawing the order for chapter 1 1  cases, Delaware's district court thus took the 
unusual step of asserting in practice the oversight authority i t  holds in theory. 
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Farnan began assigning some of the new Chapter 1 1  cases to Delaware district court 
j udges . 
To appreciate the significance of Judge Farnan's order, we must first consider the 
more general question of whether Delaware's rise to prominence is in fact malignant, as 
the Commission's proposal assumes, or  whether i ts effects should be seen in a more posi­
tive light. Drawing on both our historical discussion and the academic debate over char­
ter competition, I turn to this question in the part that follows. 
II. BANKRUPTCY I N  DELAWARE: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? 
Critics of firms' efforts to file  for bankruptcy in Delaware (or New York) tend to 
emphasize two kinds of objections: 1 )  the favored judges are too sympathetic to debtors' 
interests; and 2) the favored forum unfairly inconveniences a substantial portion of a 
debtor's creditors. 
We will focus most  extensively on the effect of venue shopping on judges , both 
because i t  goes to the heart of the bankruptcy process and because the existing debate has 
missed some of the most important implications of Delaware's recent rise to prominence. 
I wilt emphasize in particular the relationship between Delaware's bankruptcy j udges and 
Delaware's general preeminence in corporate law. Although charter competition func­
tions less effectively in bankruptcy - most obviously, due to the federal nature of bank­
ruptcy l egislation - Delaware judges still will regulate bankruptcy more efficiently than 
their peers in other districts. The analysis thus suggests that the widespread criticism of 
Delaware is mistaken. 
After exploring the relationship between venue shopping and Delaware's bank­
ruptcy judges, I consider the concern that a firm's decision to fi l e  for bankruptcy in Dela­
ware will make it too costly for most creditors to participate in the bankruptcy case, and 
argue that this concern also does not weigh against domicile-based venue. I conclude by 
considering two alternative venue reform possibilities. 
Before I dive into the analysis, however, I should first give a more specific de­
scription of the practices that critics of Delaware's bankruptcy judges find obj ectionable. 
A. What "Debtor-Friendly" Means in Delaware 
As I have noted, the standard complaint about both Delaware's and New York's 
bankruptcy judges is that they are too "debtor-friendly. "  Critics trace this bias in debtors' 
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favor to venue shopping, reasoning that j udges establ ish a reputation as debtor havens in 
order to attract the largest, most p rominent bankruptcies to their courthouse. 
Although critics often suggest that j udges in Delaware and New York are debtor­
friendly in the same way, the two districts actually have established quire different reputa­
tions among practitioners - reputations that are amply borne out by their track records 
in large cases. The New York judges are known for their will ingness to repeatedly extend 
the exclusivity period during which the managers o f  a large debtor are the o nly o nes who 
can propose a reorganization plan.62 Because extended exclusivity reduces the pressure for 
a debtor's managers to act quickly, it can encourage long, drawn-out, costly bankruptcy 
cases. 
Delaware's j udges, on the other hand, have established p recisely the opposite 
reputation. Rather than lengthy cases, Delaware is known for its speedy confirmation o f  
reorganization plans.63 Many of the large firms that file in Delaware seek to confirm 
prepackaged bankruptcy plans,64 and more traditional cases also tend to reach confirma­
tion quite quickly.65 
62. LoPucki and Whitford described this aspect of New York's reputation six years ago; 
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 56, and many commentators have noted i t  s ince. See, e.g. , Federal 
Judicial Center, Report to The Committee on The Administration ofThe Bankruptcy System , Chapter 
1 1  Venue Choice By Large Public Companies at I I I-7 (Jan. 9- 1 0, 1 997) (hereinafter Federal judicial 
Center Report) . 
63. See Federal judicial Center Report, supra note 62, at I l l-6; see also Delaware Report, 
supra note 2 at 1 5- 1 7 . 
64. In a prepackaged bankruptcy, a debtor's managers attempt to negotiate the terms of 
a reorganization plan prior to filing for bankruptcy. To minimize the length of the case,  the man­
agers generally include the reorganization plan with their petition. Although the New Deal re­
formers repeatedly criticized pre-bankruptcy negotiations in the hearings that led to the Chandler 
Act, the 1 978 Code explicitly contemplates the use of prepackaged plans. See B ankruptcy Code 
§ 1 1 26(b) (defining the parameters of prebankruptcy acceptance or rejection of  plans) . For a more 
detailed description of prepackaged bankruptcy, and an argument that it should be permitted in 
the bank insolvency context, see David A. Skeel , Jr., The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance 
Insolvency Regulation, Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1 998) .  
65 .  For specific figures on  this, see Delaware Report, supra note 2 ,  a t  1 6- 1 7  (average 
time to reorganize publicly held firm in Delaware from 1 99 1 - 1 995  was 1 1 .7 months, as compared 
to 1 5 .7 months nationally) . 
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Complaints about debtor-friendliness in Delaware focus not on extensions of 
exclusivity, but on several Delaware practices that smooth the way for a debtor. Most 
prominent is the judges' treatment of "first day orders" - the requests for use of cash 
collateral and for permission to pay employees, among other things, that a debtor often 
files along with its bankruptcy petition.66 While most bankruptcy j udges delay their ap­
proval until they can hold a hearing and give creditors an opportunity to respond, Dela­
ware judges often approve the orders almost  immediately. One j udge also is known for 
fielding calls from Delaware attorneys before a firm files for bankruptcy, and indicating, 
among other things, which of the two Delaware judges a case would be assigned to .67 
One factor the Delaware j udges do have in common with their colleagues in 
New York is their treatment of debtors' attorneys' fees . Both courts have a reputation for 
generosity in granting attorneys' fees, a factor that obviously would sit well with an attor­
ney who is helping a firm decide where to fi le for bankruptcy. 68 
The question, then, is how alarming are these tendencies? Are critics correct 
that Delaware's (and New York's) efforts to attract debtors are having, and will have, 
ruinous effects on the bankruptcy process? 
B. Racing to the Bottom or Top in Corporate Law 
As discussed in the last part, complaints about Delaware as a bankruptcy venue 
are not new; similar complaints were made in the 1 930s.  In the 1 93 0s ,  the complaints 
were integrally connected to a larger debate about whether Congress should displace the 
states as the principal regulator of corporate law. It is only by understanding the larger, 
66. The orders presented for approval at the commencement of the case - that is, first 
day orders - typically include, among others, orders approving the retention of debtor's counsel, 
approving the use of cash collateral, authorizing the payment of payroll, and authorizing the pay­
ment of various orher prepetition expenses. For a l is t  of first day orders approved in the Today's 
Man bankruptcy, see Krasny & Carey, supra note 2 .  
67 .  See, e.g. , Federal judicial Center Report, supra note 62 ,  a t  I II-9 & I I I- 1 0 ;  Ann Davis, 
Too Much Bustle in Bankruptcy Court? , Wall St. J . ,  Feb. 5, 1 997, at B 1 .  As I discuss below, many 
practitioners suspect that Judge Farnan's orders withdrawing the bankruptcy reference were prompted 
in large parr by these ex pane contacts. 
68. See, e.g. , Federal judicial Center Report, supra note 62, at I I I-7 (New York reputa­
tion for high fees) . 
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Man bankruptcy, see Krasny & Carey, supra note 2 .  
67 .  See, e.g. , Federal judicial Center Report, supra note 62, at  I I I-9 & I I I - 1  0 ;  Ann Davis, 
Too Much Bustle in Bankruptcy Court? , Wall St. ] . ,  Feb.  5 ,  1 997,  at B l .  As I discuss below, many 
practitioners suspect that Judge Farnan's orders withdrawing the bankruptcy reference were prompted 
in large part by these ex parte contacts. 
68. See, e.g. , Federal judicial Center Report, supra note 62, at I I I-7 (New York reputa­
tion for high fees) . 
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recurrem debate in corporate law that we can fully appreciate the significance of  Delaware's 
renewed importance in bankruptcy. 
In its current incarnation, the debate traces back to a 1 974 article by Will iam 
Cary (who, not coincidemally, had previously been chairman of the SEC) .69 Cary argued 
that the competition among states to attract corporate charters leads to a "race to the 
bottom."  Because m anagers are the ones who choose a firm's state of incorporation, states 
have an incentive to tailor their laws to the desires of corporate managers . Corporate 
managers are happiest if they have little accountability, and can run their firm however 
they see fit .  In their effort to attract corporations, Cary reasoned, states therefore will 
enact laws that are laxer and laxer on managers, and worse and worse for shareholders ­
hence , the "race to the bottom."  The worst offender is the biggest winner: Delaware. 
While Cary's pessimistic assessment of charter competition has proven enor­
mously influential , i t  neglected to consider a single, crucial factor: the role of markets . 
Although states do have an incentive to cater to managers, managers cannot afford to 
incorporate in states with wildly inefficient laws; not only would a firm that did so suffer 
in the product and capital markets, but its stock price also would fal l ,  thus making the 
firm an attractive takeover target.70 In view of this, charrer competition may actually 
produce a race to the top, with managers seeking and states providing relatively efficient 
laws, rather than the dismal ones Cary expected.71 
This perspective suggests that Delaware lawmaking is more l ikely to be praise­
worthy than lamemable. Much of the structure of Delaware corporate l aw appears to 
confirm this benign view. Delaware's dependance on franchise tax revenues assures that it 
wi l l  remain responsive to the needs of the corporations domiciled in the state. Delaware 
69. See Cary, supra note 3 .  
70 .  This was Ralph Winter's principal insight in h i s  critique of  the  race to the bottom 
view. Winter, supra note 3 .  Here, as in my discussion of the debate in the introduction, I have 
offered a somewhat contentious account of the debate. Other commentators are much less opti­
mistic about the curative influence of markers in this  context. For an important recen t  example, see 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: Desirable Limits on State Competition in Cor­
porate Law, 1 0 5  Harv. L. Rev. 1 435  ( 1 992) .  
7 1 .  Even on this view, however, state corporate law is likely to be only relatively effi­
cient, as I discuss below. 
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also has a small, efficient court system and j udges who are more expert in corporate law 
than the judges of any other court in the country.72 
This is not to say that Delaware lawmaking is optimal in every respect. Because 
markets are imperfect, and because it is relatively costly for Delaware firms to switch to 
another state, Delaware can permit at least some inefficiencies in its regulation of corpo­
rate law. The most obvious i l lustration of this is that several aspects of Delaware doctrine 
seem to benefit a particular interest group, the Delaware bar, at the expense of a more 
fully efficient corporate law.73 Delaware is notably generous in granting artorneys' fees in 
shareholder suits, for instance, and has adopted a l itigation-intensive approach to the 
question of when such a suit can be dismissed.74 
Despite these imperfections, however, state charter competition in general , and 
Delaware lawmaking in particular, seems far superior to federalizing corporate law as 
race-to-the-bottom theorists have proposed from rime to rime. In fact, there is a strong 
argument that the s tates also should be given authority over corporate bankruptcy. Be­
cause bankruptcy is an importanr component of corporate law, rhe same pressures that 
impel stares toward efficiency in corporate law almost certainly would cause them to 
regulate corporate bankruptcy more effectively than Congress has done.75 
What does all of this say about Delaware's recent visibil ity in the bankruptcy 
context? There are obvious differences between existing bankruptcy law and a regime that 
left bankruptcy regulation to the states. The question, then, is whether Delaware judges 
are likely to act as ifbankruptcy were truly a part of Delaware corporate law, or whether 
venue shopping will create some other kind of incen tives for Delaware judges. 
72. Roberta Romano has made each of the points in chis paragraph in a recenr book 
(and in the anicles that presaged it) .  Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 
( 1 993) . 
' 
73 .  See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of 
Delaware Corporate Law, 65  Tex L. Rev. 469 ( 1 987) .  
74.  !d. It is worth noting the connection between Delaware's reputation for generosity 
on fees in corporate law and the simirar reputation its bankruptcy j udges have in the bankruptcy 
conrext. 
7 5 .  I have made this argumenr in considerable detail and considered the objections 
and obstacles to state regulation of corporate bankruptcy, elsewhere. See David A. Skeel , Jr., supra 
note 3 .  
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C. Delaware and the Bankruptcy Race 
To understand the relationship between the Delaware bankruptcy judges and 
charter competition, we need to consider more explicitly the factors that must be present 
for charter competition to take place. Two in particular stand out for our purposes. First, 
states cannot act as competing sources of regulation unless the area in question  is regu­
lated in some way by the states. Second, it must be clear that the law of the state of 
incorporation, rather than that of some other state, will apply when a dispute arises. 
Because the states have long regulated corporate law, and the "internal affairs" doctrine 
assures that courts will look to the law of the state of incorporation in resolving corporate 
governance issues/6 corporate law satisfies both of these prerequisites - hence the well­
developed charter competition in corporate law. 
In the analysis that follows, we will consider whether these factors apply to 
Delaware's success in attracting bankruptcy filings. Although bankruptcy seems at first to 
be an unlikely context for effective charter competition, we will see on inspection that 
both prerequisites are at least partially met. 
1. The applicability of Delaware law 
The most obvious impediment to charter competition in bankruptcy is that 
bankruptcy, unlike other aspects of corporate law, is federal in nature.77 Congress sets the 
standard for recovering preferential payments or confirming a reorganization ,  not the 
states. With Congress supplying a single framework that applies in every case, the states 
cannot easily provide competing sets of bankruptcy laws. 
76. For a recent, ringing affirmation of this approach by the Supreme Court ,  see Dela­
ware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490 ( 1 993) . By contrast, if ordinary conflicts of laws principles applied 
to corporate l aw issues, and as a result the laws of states other than a firm's state of incorporation 
were frequently applied, charter competition would be seriously undermined. 
77. In  the discussion that follows, I focus on variation within the federal component 
portion of bankruptcy law. On issues not covered by the bankruptcy framework, courts have long 
deferred to state law. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S .  48, 55 ( 1 979), which underscores the 
local role in bankruptcy negotiations. 
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While the federal nature of bankruptcy law clearly interferes with charter com­
petition, it would be a mistake to conclude there is no room for local variation. Quite to 
the contrary, commentators have long noted that bankruptcy p ractice varies significantly 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.78 The differences can be either procedural or substantive 
in nature, or both. Examples of procedural variation include courts' different approaches 
to hearings or first day orders.7� Substantively, courts have adopted different approaches 
(sometimes by reference to state law) to issues ranging from the breadth of the p reference 
provisions to whether secured creditors have a securi ty interest in rents received during 
the pendency of a case. 80 A wide range of issues that fall somewhere between substantive 
and procedural , such as the decision whether to approve a postpetition financing arrange­
ment or to extend exclusivity, are similarly flexible in nature. 
Thus, it quickly becomes clear that bankruptcy judges could develop a jurisdic­
tion-specific approach to bankruptcy - one which distinguishes themselves from their 
peers in other locations. The federal nature of bankruptcy law limits but does not wholly 
remove local control over the bankruptcy process, as evidenced by the distinct reputa­
tions that Delaware and New York bankruptcy judges have developed in recent years. 
2. The question whether the "Delaware" approach will apply 
The existence of a "Delaware" approach would not by i tself lay the groundwork 
for bringing charter competition into the bankruptcy context. In addition to making the 
laws (or, as in bankruptcy, applying them in a distinct fashion) , Delaware must also be 
able to assure that the laws will in fact apply to a Delaware firm that files for bankruptcy. 
78 .  Much of the recent l i terature has considered dramatic variations among jurisdic­
tions with respect to personal bankruptcy cases. See, e.g. , Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer 
Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 Am. Banke. L.J. 5 0 1  ( 1 993) .  
79 .  See supra note 66.  
80.  Congress attempted to reduce the variations among the districts on each of these 
issues with the Bankruptcy Reform Amendments of 1 994.  Thus, the revision Bankruptcy Code 
§ 5 50 is designed to reverse the Seventh Circuit decision in Levitt v. Ingersoll Rand, 87 4 F.2d 1 1 86 
(7th Cir. 1 989) and to limit the parties from whom the trustee can recover; and the revision of 
Bankruptcy Code § 5 5 2  is intended to assure that security interests generally do extend to 
postpetition rents. 
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Outside of bankruptcy, this prerequisite is supplied by the internal affairs doc­
trine, which assures that Delaware law will apply to Delaware corporations even if the 
dispute arises elsewhere. Delaware is better off if  the parties li tigate in Delaware - local 
litigation enhances Delaware's precedent base, for instance, and benefits the local bar. But 
investors know that Delaware law also wil l  be applied by non-Delaware courts, which 
enables them to take the contours of Delaware law into account in valuing the firm. 
The "Delaware" approach to bankruptcy, by contrast, does not offer the same 
degree of portabili ty. Because Delaware's approach stems from the way the Delaware judges 
handle actual bankruptcy cases, Delaware has li ttle influence on cases filed elsewhere. 
There is no analogue to the internal affairs doctrine to instruct non-Delaware judges to 
mimic the Delaware judges' approach. As a result, the effects of charter competition will 
only extend to bankruptcy if Delaware firms that file for bankruptcy routinely bring their 
petitions in Delaware. 
The analysis thus suggests mixed conclusions as to the connection between charter 
competition and Delaware's recent prominence in bankruptcy law. On the one hand, 
Delaware's j udges are subject to the same federal bankruptcy laws as everyone else, and 
Delaware can only leave i ts stamp on bankruptcies involving Delaware corporations if the 
corporations decide to bring their cases in Delaware. On the other hand, the bankruptcy 
laws leave sufficient flexibility for the judges to develop a Delaware-specific approach, 
and Delaware corporations do increasingly file in Delaware. 
My own inclination is to view the glass as half full ,  rather than half empty. Even 
imperfect charter competition seems preferable to its absence. Moreover, the seriousness 
and sophistication of Delaware's corporate legal culture should, at least over time, mani­
fest itself in the bankruptcy context. 8 1 In the analysis that follows, I suggest that strong 
evidence supporting this optimistic view already exists.82 
8 1 .  Roberta Romano has frequently emphasized the importance of Delaware's judicial 
expertise. See, e.g. , Romano, supra nore 72, ar 3 8  & n.20.  For a derailed description of rhe process 
by which Delaware chancery and supreme court judges are selected, see David A. Skeel, J r. ,  The 
Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1 27 ( 1 997) .  
82 .  This is not to say the Delaware bankruptcy court is  ideal . As I have suggested, some 
of rhe recent concerns, particularly those about j udges' ex parte contacts with the Delaware bar, 
clearly are legitimate. 
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D. The Evidence So Far: Assessing the Delaware Approach 
Thus far, I have argued in relatively abstract terms that the benefits of charter 
competition should also have at least some effect on the Delaware bankruptcy court. 
Over time, at least, the efficiency or inefficiency of Delaware's bankruptcy process should 
be reflected in the value of Delaware corporations. 
In this section, I take a closer look at several aspects of the Delaware approach, 
in order to determine whether Delaware appears to be improving or undermining bank­
ruptcy law. I also offer several predictions as to rhe future direction of the Delaware court 
if Congress retains domicile as a venue option. 
1. The Delaware specialty: prepacks and speed 
As suggested earlier, Delaware's bankruptcy judges have established a reputation 
for speed. 83 In striking contrast to New York, which has tended to specialize in unusual 
and complex cases, Delaware has become the leading destination of prepackaged bank­
ruptcy fil ings . Delaware's judges also tend to confirm traditional Chapter 1 1  cases much 
more quickly than judges in other districts. 
Venue shopping in bankruptcy has rhus produced a clientele effect, with Dela­
ware attracting firms that seek to reorganize quickly. Interestingly, several commentators 
have argued that charter competition is characterized by a similar dynamic outside of 
bankruptcy. Professors Baysinger and Butler, for instance, contend that different states 
specialize in attracting different kinds of corporations. 84 While rhe theory has only lim­
ited explanatory power in the general corporate context, the process of specialization is 
quite evident in bankruptcy. An obvious explanation for Delaware's striking specializa­
tion is that Delaware is only one of several venue options, and managers have strong 
practical reasons to fi le where their offices are located. 85 By holding out the prospect of a 
83 .  See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
84 .  Barry D. Baysinger and Henry Buder, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the 
Firm, 28 J .L. & Econ. 1 79 (1 985 ) .  
8 5 .  Recall that Senator Hastings made precisely this argument in  defense of Delaware 
venue in the 1 930s. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. For evidence that managers do in 
fact tend to file for bankruptcy in the district of the firms' headquarters, see LoPucki & Whitford, 
supra note 56, at 26-29, (suggesting that 36 of the 43 cases studied were filed in the district where 
the firms' headquarters were) . 
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prompt reorganization, Delaware counteracts managers' concerns as ro the disruptiveness 
of an out-of-rown filing. 
What, then, are we to make of these developments? Is Delaware's penchant for 
speed desirable, or cause for concern? The obvious answer is that the Delaware approach 
has a great deal to commend it .  To be sure, some of the criticisms of D elaware's j udges are 
well-founded - most obviously, the complaints about ex parte contacts with members of 
the Delaware bar. 8 6  But Delaware has successfully addressed the single biggest problem 
with Chapter 1 1  in recent years - the inordinate time and expense of the reorganization 
processY 
One final note on prepackaged bankruptcies. Recent empirical evidence sug­
gests that prepackaged bankruptcies are quicker, less expensive, and entail smaller devia­
tions from absolute priority than traditional Chapter 1 I  reorganizations.8� Yet one still 
might debate whether routine confirmation of prepackaged plans is a welcome develop­
ment. It is conceivable, for instance, that some prepackaged plans effect a redistribution 
from scattered, general creditors to large creditors such as the institutional investors that 
often hold publicly issued and privately placed bonds. Despite this and other concerns, 
prepackaged plans seem on balance to offer an attractive balance berween the benefits of 
an out-of-bankruptcy workout and of Chapter I I . For the firms most amenable ro a 
prepackaged plan - publicly held firms with relatively uncomplicated capital structures 
- the benefits of avoiding a full-blown Chapter I I  process may be substantial . 
In sum, Delaware's bankruptcy judges have responded to venue shopping by 
establishing a reputation for speedy reorganization. Although one could quibble as to 
whether prepackaged bankruptcy plans are desirable, the fact remains that Delaware's 
86. These complaints apparently were magnified by Delaware lawyers' word-of-mouth 
advertisement rhar they could get things done in the Delaware bankruptcy courrs that would not 
be possible elsewhere. 
87. The cost and delay of chapter 1 1  has been widely criticized in recent years. For a 
description of its sources, see David A. Skeel, Jr. ,  Markets, Courts and the Brave New World of 
Bankruptcy Theory, 1 993 Wise. L. Rev. 4 7 1  ( 1 993) .  
88 .  Elizabeth Tashj ian, Ronald C. Lease, & John J .  McConnell, An Empirical Analysis 
of Prepackaged Bankruptcies, 40  J .  Fin .  Econ.  1 3 5  (1 996). Note that prepackaged bankruptcies 
ideally might bridge the differences between out-of-bankruptcy workouts and full-blown chapter 
1 1  cases. See Stuart C. Gilson, Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Finan­
cially Distressed Firms, 52 J .  Fin. 1 6 1  (1 997) (finding that firms reduce their leverage more in 
chapter 1 1  than through our-of-bankruptcy workouts) . 
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j udges have counteracted the single most pervasive problem with Chapter 1 1  - the time 
and expense the process entails. 
2. Substantive effects - fiduciary duties and directorial elections 
Less obvious than the relative duration of Delaware bankruptcy cases is whether 
and how venue shopping will affect the court's decisions on substantive issues. If I am 
correct that nonbankruptcy corporate charter competition will influence Delaware 
decisionmaking in bankruptcy, the effect should extend to specific substantive issues. 
One set of issues j umps out as a particularly promising candidate for doctrinal develop­
ment: the nature of directors' fiduciary duties when a firm is insolvent and the related 
question of whether shareholders are entitled to elect directors in bankruptcy. To show 
this, I will briefly describe the recent case law on each of these issues, then speculate as to 
how venue shopping may influence future developments. 
In a series of cases in recent years, bankruptcy judges in New York and the 
chancery court in Delaware have faced the question of whether shareholders can call a 
shareholders' meeting during the bankruptcy case for the purpose of displacing the cur­
rent directors . 89 The request almost invariably comes when shareholders fear the directors 
will support an unfavorable reorganization plan, and the practical issue is whether to 
allow shareholders to use their nonbankruptcy voting rights as a source of bargaining 
leverage. The existing case law concludes that shareholders can invoke these rights absent 
"extraordinary circumstances," just as they could outside of bankruptcy, although courts 
have denied the request on several occasions.90 
Elsewhere, I have argued that courts' general sympathy for the shareholders' 
position may be a perverse effect of the separation between state-regulated corporate law 
and federal bankruptcy law - an effect I refer to as vestigialization .91 Because sharehold-
89. Prominent recent cases include Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In 
re Johns-Manville Corp.) ,  8 0 1  F.2d 60 (2d Cir .  1 986) (enjoining meeting because i t  would consti­
tute a "clear abuse" ) ;  Lionel Corp. v. Committee of Equity Sec. Holders (In re Lionel Corp. ) ,  30 
Bankr. 327 (Bankr. S .D .  N.Y. 1 983) (permitting shareholders committee to ask Delaware chancery 
court to authorize shareholders' meeting) . I have commented critically on these cases in David A. 
Skeel, Jr . ,  supra note 3, at 506-09;  David A. Skeel, J r. ,  The Nature and Effict of Corporate Voting in 
Chapter I I Reorganization Cases, 78 Va. L. Rev. 46 1 ,  48 5 -86  ( 1 992) .  
90. !d. 
9 1 .  Skeel, supra note 3 .  
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ers are n o  longer the residual owners o f  a n  insolvent firm, they have poor decision-mak­
ing incentives and thus should lose their authority over the board of directors if the firm 
files for bankruptcy. If anyone votes, it should be the firm's unsecured creditors .  Yet, 
because bankruptcy courts look to state law for guidance on this issue, and state decision­
makers regulate with healthy corporations in mind, courts have concluded that share­
holders should have the same powers in bankruptcy that they have while the corporation 
is solvent. 
Interestingly, on the issue of directors' fiduciary duties, several nonbankruptcy 
courts have recently suggested that directors' duties change when a firm becomes insol­
vent. Most prominently, Chancellor Allen stated in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, Nv. 
v. Pathe Communications Corp.92 that corporate directors must consider creditors' inter­
ests as well as shareholders' in the event of insolvency. 
My analysis of venue shopping predicts that the return of bankruptcy cases to 
Delaware will counteract the effects of vestigialization, and that Delaware's chancery and 
bankruptcy courts will develop an increasingly consistent, coherent app roach to these 
issues. Most obviously, I would expect the courts to develop a strong p resumption against 
permitting shareholders to elect new directors in bankruptcy, at least in the contexts where 
the issue has tended to arise.93 
At first glance, a recent decision in the Marvel reorganization might appear to 
belie my prediction.  In Marvel, the district court upheld a shareholders' meeting request 
that was quite explicitly designed to displace Marvel's current board of directors .94 AI-
92. No. Civ. A. 1 2 1 50 ,  1 9 9 1  WL 2776 1 3  (Del . Ch. Dec. 30, 1 99 1 ) . 
93. As suggested in the text, the issue arises well after the bankruptcy filing, in the 
context of negotiations on a particular reorganization plan. By contrast, one can imagine Delaware 
j udges permitting a shareholder vote earlier in a case if, for instance, a group of shareholders wishes 
to challenge the filing. 
In fai rness, I should note that, even if my predictions were to prove p rescient, i t  might 
not provide conclusive evidence that venue shopping has benign effects. One could also interpret 
the developments in other ways. Removing shareholders' right to replace d i rectors, for instance, 
could be viewed as a means of insulating directors from scrutiny - particularly if  the right to 
replace d irectors were simply eliminated rather than given to creditors. 
94. Official Bondholders Committee v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc. (In re Mar­
vel) , C.A. No. 97- 1 46-RRM, slip op. at 12 (D. Del. May 1 4 ,  1 997) ( " ( i ] t  is well settled that the 
right of shareholders to compel a shareholders' meeting . . .  subsists during reorganization proceed­
ings. " ) .  
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though the opinion carries ringing endorsements o f  shareholders' right t o  invoke their 
voting rights in bankruptcy, the context in which the decision arose puts i t  in a somewhat 
different light. The "shareholders" in the case were a group of bondholders, led by Carl 
Icahn, who became shareholders when the bankruptcy court permitted them to foreclose 
on stock that Ronald Perelman of Marvel had pledged to secure the bonds.95 Thus, the 
effect of the decision is to permit a group of creditors to replace Marvel's directors ,  a result 
much more in line with the position I have argued for than the language of the opinion 
might suggest. 
It is still too early to state with any certainty how venue shopping will affect 
Delaware decision-making on substantive issues . But my analysis suggests both that it 
will have an effect, and that the effect is likely to be a generally desirable one. 
3. Judicial expertise and judicial culture 
Thus far, I have offered evidence and a bit of speculation in support of my 
contention that charter competition will beneficially influence Delaware bankruptcy cases. 
The fact that Congress rather than the states regulates bankruptcy seriously dilutes the 
effect, but Delaware still has enough flexibil ity to leave its stamp on bankruptcy law. In 
this subsection ,  we turn more directly to the judges themselves. Once again, we will see 
both that federal regulation interferes with state decision-making, and that Delaware's 
influence nevertheless shines through. 
An important part of Delaware's success in corporate law lies in i ts remarkable 
judiciary. As befi ts Delaware's longstanding preeminence in corporate law, Delaware's 
judges as a group offer more expertise and sophistication than those of any other court in 
95. Moreover, some observers suspect that Judge Farnan's order withdrawing the bank­
ruptcy court's reference may have influenced the sequence of events that shifted authority to the 
Marvel bondholders. See, e.g. Ann Davis, Delaware Court's Actions in Marvel Case Viewed as Mes­
sage to Corporate Debtors, Wall St. J . ,  June 3 0 ,  1 997,  at B 1 2 . 
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the country.96 Moreover, the state's careful selection process, in  which the corporate bar 
plays a prominent role, is carefully designed to assure that things stay this way.97 
Because bankruptcy j udgeships are federal , Delaware's bankruptcy j udges are 
chosen through an entirely different  process . Bankruptcy judges are appointed by the 
federal court of appeals .98 Thus, the federal judges of the Third Circuit,  rather than Dela­
ware, determine who will fil l  Delaware's bankruptcy court. 
Yet this is not the end of the story. Although Delaware does not  have formal 
authority over the selection of bankruptcy judges, as a practical matter i ts bar is l ikely to 
be the principal source of nominees. And in fact this has proven to be the case. The 
practice that has developed in the Third Circuit, as in other circuits, is to assemble a l ist of 
nominations - generally provided by the local bar - which is forwarded to the Third 
Circuit .  Bankruptcy judgeships are then filled from the list of nominees .99 
Given the obvious value of a vigorous corporate bankruptcy practice to the Dela­
ware bar, the bar can be expected to exercise some of the same care in nominating bank­
ruptcy judges that it does with Delaware chancery and supreme court j udges. It is too 
early to tell for sure, but the selection of Delaware's two current bankruptcy judges seems 
to confirm this prediction.  When Delaware's senior bankruptcy judge, Judge Helen Balick, 
96. See supra note 8 1  and accompanying text. For an exploration of the way in which 
the Delaware courts establ ish standards of corporate behavior, often through opinions that distin­
guish in quasi-moral terms between appropriate and inappropriate directorial performance, see 
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work? , 44 U.C.L.A. L. 
Rev. 1 009 ( 1 997) .  See also Skeel, supra note 8 1 ,  at 1 63-72 (describing "moral dimension" in Dela­
ware decision making) . 
97. For a detailed discussion of Delaware's j udicial selection process, see David A. Skeel, 
Jr. , supra note 8 1 .  
98 .  See 28 U.S .  C. § 1 52(a) ( l )  (court of appeals to make appointments "after consider­
ing the recommendations of the Judicial Conference") .  
99. More precisely, the judicial council o f  each court o f  appeals i s  responsible for mak­
ing recommendations to the circuit court. The Judicial Conference recommends that the judicial 
councils appoint a merit selection panel with at least three members to assist them in assembling 
nominations. The merit selection panel is expected to submit five to ten names to the judicial 
council, which then submits at least three nominees to the court of appeals. For a detailed descrip­
tion of the selection process, see Administrative Office ofThe United States Courts, The Selection 
and Appointment of United States Bankruptcy Judges , at 9- 1 0  ( 1 994) (merit selection panels ) ;  id. 
at 1 8- 2 1  (submission of names) . 
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was selected in 1 9 84 ,  Delaware's bankruptcy court had no particular prominence; and 
the selection process drew little of the attention that chancery and state supreme court 
judgeships receive. 100 
By 1 99 1 ,  when Delaware added a second bankruptcy judge, Peter Walsh, things 
were just beginning to change. The Continental case had pur Delaware on the map, and 
the connection ro Delaware's role in corporate law was becoming more clear. The Dela­
ware bar took a more active interest in the selection process; it almost certainly will take 
an even greater interest in future appointment decisions, and will exercise the same kind 
of care as it  does with the chancery and supreme court nominations. Moreover, once they 
are selected, Delaware's judges become p art of the same corporate culture that has played 
so prominent a role in corporate law generally. 
It is important ro emphasize that the selection of bankruptcy judges is "not 
exactly" (to return to the commercial I described in the Introduction to this article) like 
Delaware's selection of chancery and supreme court judges. The Third Circuit can, if it 
wishes , completely circumvent the Delaware bar in its selection of bankruptcy judges for 
the District of Delaware. Nevertheless, under ordinary circumstances, rhe Delaware bar 
will play an important role and will select for many of rhe same qualities we see in Delaware's 
regulation of corporate law. 
4. Delaware's dance with Congress 
In order to further underscore the connection between Delaware's roles in cor­
porate law and bankruptcy, I conclude this discussion of "evidence" by returning to the 
recent orders withdrawing the bankruptcy court's reference. 
As noted earlier, in February, 1 997, after the controversy over Delaware venue 
had spurred the National Bankruptcy Review Commission to adopt its proposal to elimi­
nate domici le-based venue, Chief Judge Farnan of the District Court reversed the auto­
matic reference of Chapter 1 1  cases to the bankruptcy judges. 10 1 His order, as clarified in 
a subsequent order, announced that rhe district court judges would begin overseeing �orne 
of Delaware's bankruptcy cases. 
1 00 .  This is not intended to be a comment on Judge Balick, who is rightly perceived to 
be a talented bankruptcy j udge. Rather, my focus is on the nature and competitiveness of the 
selection process. 
1 0  1 .  See supra note 2. 
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Observers were quick w suspect a connection between Judge Farnan's order and 
the precarious s tatus of Delaware venue. What no one seems to have noticed, however, is 
that the sequence of events finds a fascinating echo in Delaware's regulation of corporate 
law. In the late 1 970s, as Ralph Nader and o thers pressed Congress to enact a federal 
incorporation statute, the Delaware Supreme Court engaged in a s tarding shift in direc­
tion in i ts treatment of a controversial issue: freezeout mergers used by firms to eliminate 
their minority shareholders . 1 02 The principal effect was to subject the transactions to much 
greater scrutiny, and as a result to defuse critics' claims that Delaware was too lax on 
managers and other insiders . 1 03 Some commentators have drawn a s imilar connection 
between the court's 1 98 9  decision in Time-Warner, 1 04 which made it more difficult to 
effectuate hostile takeovers, and prior efforts to p rod Congress to enact federal ant i  takeover 
legislation. In each case, the Delaware Supreme Court cleverly preempted federal legisla­
tion by, in effect, saying "we get the message . "  
I t  i s  important not t o  overstate the case that Judge Farnan's order was s imilarly 
designed to dissuade Congress from eliminating domici le-based venue. The o rder i tself 
pointed to Delaware's overcrowded docket as the reason for asserting district court con­
trol over the bankruptcy docket; and several members of the Delaware bar have suggested 
to me that Judge Farnan was simply angry at reports of ex parte contact between Dela-
1 02.  The principal shift came in  Singer v. Magna vox, 380 A.2d 969 ( Del. 1 977) . The 
Delaware Supreme Court quickly retreated from Singer; see Tanzer v. Internodal Gen. I ncus. , 379 
A. 2d 1 1 2 1  (Del .  1 977) ; and subsequently abandoned it .  See, e.g. , Weinberger v .  UOP, Inc . ,  4 5 7  
A. 2d 70 1 (Del. 1 983 ) .  
1 03 .  A member of  the Delaware bar offers a nicely understated account of the dance 
between Delaware and Congress: "The [debate over whether to enact a federal incorporation stat­
ute] was conducted in law journals and on the seminar circuit for several years but eventually 
subsided without congressional intervention after the Delaware Supreme Court rendered a series 
of decisions upholding minority challenges to corporate actions. Whether the decisions repre­
sented a shift in approach . . .  became a moot point when the critics chose to view them as a re­
sponse to their concerns ."  David A. Drexler, The Growth of Corporate Law, in Delaware Bar, supra 
note 42, at 583 ,  596-97. 
1 04 .  Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. ,  5 7 1  A.2d 1 1 4 0  (Del .  1 989 ) .  
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ware bankruptcy j udges and the bar. 1 0 5  Moreover, Judge Farnan is not viewed as part of 
the "in group" by the Delaware corporate bar, which suggests that he may be less l ikely 
than , say, a D elaware chancery or supreme court judge to respond to the perceived best 
interests of the Delaware corporate law culture. 
Yet the order came too close on the heels of the venue controversy for the echoes 
of the corporate law shifts to be dismissed. Further, even if the impetus for the order was 
anger over reports of ex parte contacts, it nevertheless reflects a remarkable responsiveness 
to concerns about Delaware practice. 
This responsiveness has important implications for the analysis of this part. On 
the corporate law side,  even die-hard critics of Delaware's role in corporate law have 
acknowledged that the threat of federalization has had beneficial effects on Delaware 
lawmaking. 106 By analogy, this suggests that the threat that Congress will end domicile­
based venue should assuage the concerns of those who are not persuaded that charter 
competi tion will, by i tself, s teer Delaware bankruptcy practice in the right direction. 
E. The Problem of Creditor Inconvenience 
Our analysis of charter competition has assumed that bankruptcy is simply an 
element of corporate law, and is influenced by essentially the same forces . While this is 
largely true, there is at least one important difference . Unlike other corporate law issues, 
which tend to involve two-party disputes between shareholders and directors, bankruptcy 
also implicates a large category of third parries: the creditors of the fi rm. It is in consider­
ing this additional constituency that we come to the second major concern with Dela­
ware venue, the concern that Delaware filings will inconvenience the firm's creditors. 1 07 
1 0 5 .  Another lawyer suggested that Judge Farnan was angry because the bankruptcy 
judges had submitted a request for additional bankruptcy judgeships without informing him fi rst. 
Following the order and the controversy ir provoked, a group of Delaware lawyers mer privately 
with Judge Farnan on a weekly basis to discuss rhe status of Delaware bankruptcy court p ractice. 
1 06 .  Melvin Eisenberg, co-author with the late William Cary and similarly skeptical of 
Delaware's role in  corporate law, stares in  their casebook, for instance, that " [o)ver rhe past ten or 
fifteen years, Delaware's position on statutory innovations has been moderate, and often even 
statesman-like;" Cary & Eisenberg, supra note 50,  at 1 29-30; and concludes that the threat of 
federal regulation has made i t  "no longer fai r  to say that Delaware i s  leading the race to the corpo­
rate bottom. "  !d. at 1 3 1 .  
1 07 .  As we saw i n  our historical debate over bankruptcy venue,  see Parr I (B) ,  supra, these 
concerns about creditor inconvenience have a long history. 
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The concern can b e  seen most vividly i f  we consider a firm whose only real 
conracr with Delaware is its status as a Delaware corporation. Suppose that the firm does 
much of its business in California, and many of its creditors, such as i ts suppliers ,  are 
located there. If bankruptcy were filed in Delaware, the costs of participation for Califor­
nia creditors might be prohibitive, whereas a California filing would be within reach. 
Eliminating domicile-based venue, the reasoning goes, would force firms to file in a more 
convenienr location. 1 08 
While creditor inconvenience is a genuine concern, there are several reasons to 
believe it does not call for ending domicile-based venue. First, it is important to keep in 
mind that the firms that choose Delaware as a venue location nearly always are publicly 
held.  The vast maj ority of firms are closely held and incorporate locally. With these firms, 
there will never be any serious question about venue. Moreover, those firms that are pub­
licly held often do business in numerous states. As a result, any filing location is l ikely to 
inconvenience a significanr number of creditors. 
Second, the managers of a firm have a significanr incentive to avoid venues that 
are inconvenient to the firm's headquarters. 1 09 If the bankruptcy is l ikely to be time­
consuming, filing in a distant locale would mean serious disruption to their own work 
schedules, as the managers traveled to the bankruptcy forum to appear in hearings. The 
managers of Dow-Corning, for instance, have been quoted as saying they never consid­
ered fil ing anywhere other than Michigan, since that is where the firm's headquarters and 
much of its operations are. 
To be sure, this still leaves a number of firms whose filing in Delaware would be 
further away for a majority of creditors than a filing in another plausible location. 1 1 0 
Given that many of these creditors are unlikely to participate in any event,  however, and 
1 08 .  For an effort to quantify the potential inconvenience of a Delaware filing, see Fed­
eral judicial Center Report, supra note 62, at I J I- 1 2  to I I I-25 (concluding that Delaware is more 
inconvenient on average than the firm's principal place ofbusiness, though the difference is much 
smaller when only large creditors are considered) . 
1 09 .  A headquarters-based filing may be quite inconvenient to creditors if, for instance, 
the firm's operations are centered in a different state. But this kind of inconvenience is unrelated to 
the domicile-based venue issue, since the question here is whether a domicile-based filing under­
mines creditors' interests. 
1 1 0 .  As indicated by the evidence analyzed in Federal judicial Center Report, supra note 
62, at I I I- 1 1 to I II -2 5 .  
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will be represented in important respects by the creditors committee, it would be a mis­
take to eliminate domicile-based venue in an effort to facilitate creditor participation . 1 1 1 
This is particularly true if we consider the offsetting benefits of Delaware venue. To the 
extent lawmakers wish to encourage creditor involvement, a better approach would be to 
approach this goal directly, through measures designed to reduce the cost of participa­
tion. 1 1 2  
F. Two Alternative Directions for Venue Reform 
Roberta Romano has characterized charter competition as the "genius" of cor­
porate law. 1 1 3 I have argued throughout this part that although the effect is attenuated in  
bankruptcy, the  same process also provides grounds for optimism about Delaware's role 
in corporate bankruptcy, particularly when we take the effect of Delaware's judicial cul­
ture into account - and that this remains true even in view of concerns about creditor 
inconvenience. The obvious conclusion to draw from this is that i t  would be a mistake to 
eliminate domicile-based venue. 
The attenuated nature of the benefits of Delaware bankruptcy does, however, 
raise the question whether bankruptcy venue could be adjusted in a way that offered sti l l  
greater benefits. In this section, we will briefly consider two possibi l i ties, each of which 
would preserve the possibility of Delaware venue. 
First, rather than simply permitting debtors to file in their state of incorpora­
tion, lawmakers might require them to do so. Requiring firms to file in their state of 
incorporation would eliminate venue shopping, and it would also assure that the benefits 
of charter competition applied more ful ly to bankruptcy, since a firm's choice of domicile 
I l l . The preoccupation with encouraging creditor participation has intriguing parallels 
to longstanding efforts in corporate law to use the federal securities laws to promote shareholder 
involvemenr in corporate governance. In  the corporate governance context, Easterbrook and Fischel 
have argued powerfully that these efforts are costly and unnecessary, s ince most shareholders are 
rational in remaining uninvolved. Frank H .  Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate 
Law, 26 J .L. & Econ. 395  ( 1 983) .  
1 1 2. LoPucki and Whitford have suggested several measures of this sort,  such as  permit­
ting creditors to participate in hearings via telephone. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 62, at 49 .  
1 1 3 .  Romano, supra note 72. 
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would determine its bankruptcy venue, just as i t  determines other aspects of  s tate corpo­
rate law. 1 1 4  
An obvious concern with this approach (as with the existing approach, since i t  
permits domicile-based venue) i s  that a firm might strategically change i ts s tate o f  incor­
poration on the eve of bankruptcy in order to take advantage of a particularly debtor­
friendly venue. The possibility of strategic reincorporation undermines charter competi­
tion, the argument goes, because markets will not effectively account for differences in 
bankruptcy fora if a firm can make a last-minute switch . 1 1 5  On inspection, this concern 
proves quite manageable. Although shareholder or creditor approval of any reincorporation 
may not be an effective check, 1 1 6 venue manipulations can be addressed by simply disal­
lowing eve of bankruptcy changes of venue. 1 1 7 
An additional concern with l imiting venue to domicile is that there sometimes 
are good reasons for fil ing in a location other than the state of incorporation.  If  the case is 
likely co be p rotracted, for instance, fil ing near the firm's headquarters or p rincipal p lace 
of business may reduce the disruption caused by the bankruptcy process . 
1 1 4 .  Recall that, in the current venue regime, a firm's venue choice cannot be deter­
mined in advance because firms have a variety of venue options at the rime they file for bank­
ruptcy. Limiting a firm's venue choice to a single option would improve the market's ability to 
account for the relevant bankruptcy regime in pricing rhe firm's stock. This, in turn, would en­
hance firms' incentive to seek, and bankruptcy j udges to provide, efficient bankruptcy regulation. 
1 1 5 . I n  corporate law, Lucian Bebchuk has made the analogous argument that the pos­
sibility of opportunistic, midstream charter amendments may undermine the efficiency of corpo­
rate law. Lucian A.  Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Con­
straints on Charter Amendments, 1 02 Harv. L. Rev. 1 820 ( 1 989) .  
1 1 6 .  Shareholder approval i s  problematic because shareholders may, l ike  managers, ben­
efit from the last-minute switch if  the forum is biased in favor of their interests. Skeel, supra note 
3, at 544 .  Creditor voting or a vote of all consistencies alleviates this problem somewhat, bur 
would entail an appreciable administrative burden and in practice might prove to be, in essence, a 
referendum on the reorganization as a whole. 
1 1 7 .  !d. at 544-45 .  In fact, the current venue provision already does j ust this, by basing 
domicile (as well as  principal place of business and assets) on the firm's location during the major­
ity of rhe 1 80-day period before bankruptcy. The provision rhus gives effect o nly to venue shifts 
that occur at least ninety days before bankruptcy, since this assures that the firm has been in the 
new location for a majority of rhe 1 80-day period.  Although one might wish to expand the period 
a bit, it nicely prevents last-minute domicile changes. 
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A second alternative would be to permit firms to make their venue choice in 
advance, by specifying in their certificate of incorporation where any subsequent bank­
ruptcy will be filed . 1 1 8 As with limiting venue to the state of incorporation, the contrac­
tual choice approach would harness market forces more effectively than the existing re­
gime, s ince investors could price a firm's choice of bankruptcy venue along with the other 
factors that influence the value of a firm's securities . Moreover, in contrast to domicile­
only venue, contractual choice would enable a firm to choose a bankruptcy venue that 
best fits the profile of the firm. 
The principal l imitation of contractual choice is that it assumes a firm can de­
termine in advance what kind of bankruptcy regime will prove most efficient. In p ractice, 
this may often not be the case. Managers may not have the foresight to know, for in­
stance, whether financial problems that arise a decade hence will be best addressed through 
a prepackaged bankruptcy (which Delaware currently specializes in) or a more lengthy 
renegotiation process (the New York speciality) . 
To enhance this approach, lawmakers could permit a fi rm to change its choice 
midstream, subj ect to a shareholder and/or creditor vote. A switching mechanism of this 
sort would not only pose an appreciable administrative burden, however, as noted above, 1 1 9 
but managers also would often face a formidable signaling problem because a decision to 
switch bankruptcy venues midstream sends a strong signal as to the precariousness of the 
firm's current p rospects . 1 20 What this suggests is that the contractual choice approach is 
l ikely to be most effective if  firms generally can determine the most appropriate bank­
ruptcy venue well in advance of actual financial distress. 
Despite these caveats, both the "domicile-only" and contractual choice approaches 
have the important virtues of bringing market forces more fully to bear on the bank­
ruptcy process, and thus encouraging bankruptcy judges to develop a reputation for effi­
ciency. As a result, ei ther might improve on the existing regime. 
1 18. This is the approach that Rasmussen and Thomas endorse and defend in their 
article on the Delaware venue controversy. Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 4. As the analysis 
below suggests, I also find the approach attractive, but view it as having relatively significant limi­
tations. 
1 1 9 . See supra note 1 1 6 and accompanying text. 
1 20. Interestingly, a firm that decides to change its state of incorporation in a domicile­
only regime may face less of a signaling problem, because i t  may be less obvious why the firm has 
decided to make the switch. 
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From this perspective, the existing regime may b e  a second-best approach. Yet 
the current approach does provide at least some of  the benefits of the approaches we have 
j ust considered, which underscores the importance of  preserving a domicile-based venue 
option. 1 2 1  
III. PUBLIC CHOICE AND 
THE FUTURE OF BANKRUPTCYVENUE 
In the last part, we saw that the criticisms of Delaware venue are, on the whole, 
quite uncompelling. If  this is so, why has the outcry against Delaware venue been so 
vociferous and widespread? Although concerns about inappropriate ex parte contacts surely 
are one factor, at least as important is the pervasive support for change among bankruptcy 
lawyers and bankruptcy judges. It seems at times as if everyone outside o f  Delaware favors 
the proposed reform. 
From a political perspective, the stance of  most bankruptcy lawyers and bank­
ruptcy judges i s  not surprising. Nearly every prominent case filed in Delaware is a case 
that would have landed in a non-Delaware bankruptcy court, and benefitted non-Dela­
ware lawyers, were i t  not for domicile-based venue. 
The question we will consider in this part is whether this opposition to Dela­
ware venue is l ikely to prove successful. Thus, we will shift from the normative question 
of  whether reform is desirable, to the descriptive issue of whether i t  is l ikely. The method­
ology I will use throughout the analysis is that of public choice. After b riefly describing 
the insights of p ublic choice most relevant to the bankruptcy venue issue, I will integrate 
these insights into the historical analysis of the beginning of the article in an effort to 
isolate the key political variables in venue reform. 
1 2 1 .  The analysis of this part also suggests that the venue provision is overly generous in 
permitting firms to file in a location where any of their affiliates have filed. B ecause the additional 
option of filing in the location of a minor affiliate interferes with the market's ability to accurately 
price the effects of different bankruptcy regimes, it would make sense to require that consolidated 
filings be made in  the location or domicile of the core business. Although complaints about using 
affiliate fil ings as a "venue hook" seem to have gotten drowned out by the furor over Delaware, the 
complaints were justified. 
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Often described as the "use of economic tools to deal with the traditional prob­
lems of political science," 1 22 public choice s tarts from (or explicitly challenges) the as­
sumption char politicians, voters, and other relevant actors act in their own self interest .  1 23 
For politicians, self interest generally means re-election; for voters, it means selecting the 
representatives most closely aligned with their interests. Yet general voters face a signifi­
cant collective action problem : because they have relatively l ittle stake in the outcome of 
an election, voters have little incentive to inform themselves. Concentrated interest groups, 
by contrast, participate actively in the political process - voting and contributing co 
legislators' campaigns, for instance. Because of this, re-election-minded legislators respond 
more to interest groups than to voters generally, and interest groups wield disproportion­
ace influence. 
While interest group theory alone is quite powerful as an explanatory tool, a 
more compelling account should take additional factors into account. Many otherwise 
apathetic voters may have strong views on some issues - a factor we can loosely define as 
ideology. Where chis is so, general voters may have significant influence on the decision­
making process. 1 24 
For our purposes, the most important extension of chis analysis is the applica­
tion of public choice insights to federalism - that is, the division of responsibility be­
tween Congress and the states. Although Congress might seem ro have an incentive to 
legislate in as many areas as possible, federal legislators have left a wide range of issues to 
the scares. Why is chis? In an insightful article, Jon Macey argues that in some contexts, 
avoiding an issue rather than addressing i t  is the best way for Congress to maximize its 
rents from interest groups. He identifies several areas where self-interested federal legisla­
tors will accede to state control . If a state (or states) has developed particularized expertise 
or a reputational interest, for instance, Congress may obtain more support from local 
1 22 .  Gordon Tullock, Public Choice, in 3 The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics 
1 040 ,  1 040 (John Earwell ,  et al . ,  eds . ,  1 987) . 
1 23 .  For a much more derailed discussion of public choice analysis, including each of 
the points considered in the text that follows, see David A. Skeel, Jr. ,  Public Choice and the Future 
of Public Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 647 ( 1 9 97) . 
1 24 .  See, e.g. , Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 9 1  Colum. 
L. Rev. 1 0 ,  3 1 -32 ( 1 99 1 ) .  For discussion of the role of ideology in bankruptcy legislation, see 
Skeel, supra note 1 0 .  
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regulacors if it agrees co forego federal legislation than it could by intervening . 1 25 As his 
principal il lustration of such a context, Macey cites Delaware's interest in retaining its 
status as the preeminent regulator of corporate law. 1 26 
If we apply these insights to the earlier 1 930s debate about Delaware venue, the 
result is puzzling. Even then, Delaware had a strong interest in s tate regulation of corpo­
rate law, since Delaware had displaced New Jersey as America's premier corporate address; 
and corporate reorganization was very much a part of the Delaware chancery court's 
practice. 1 17 Yet ,  by the end of the 1 930s,  Congress had eliminated firms' ability to look to 
their state of incorporation as a venue option. 
Two factors help to explain why Congress eliminated Delaware venue in the 
Chandler Act, whereas the New Deal reformers failed in their efforts to p ropose a federal 
incorporation statute. 1 28 First, Delaware's role in corporate reorganization  was quite p re­
carious from the beginning. Although the Delaware chancery court developed a well­
known expertise in handling equity receiverships, the equity receiverships filed elsewhere 
were routinely brought in federal courts in order to avoid the jurisdictional obstacles 
faced by a state courr. 1 19 
1 25 .  Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of 
Regulation: Toward a Public Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 Va. L. Rev. 265 ,  276- 8 1  ( 1 990) . 
Macey also identifies two orher contexts where Congress will defer to the stares: 1 )  if (as with gun 
control) rhe support-maximizing approach may vary from stare ro stare; id. ar 28 1 -84 ;  and 2) on 
particularly controversial issues (such as abortion) ,  where every approach may be  politically risky. 
!d. ar 284-90. 
1 26. !d. ar 277-80.  As the analysis below will make clear, stare regulation of  corporate 
law is better explained as a combination of one stare (Delaware) having a particular interest in 
regulation, and other stares having a similar though weaker interest in continued state control. 
1 27. See supra note 20 and accompanying rexr. 
1 28 .  While rhe reformers failed ro enact a federal incorporation stature, they did of 
course federalize important portions of corporate law through the Securities Act of 1 933  and rhe 
Securities Exchange Act of 1 934. What they did nor do is eliminate stare charter competition and 
stares' general preeminence in corporate law, which was the principal goal of a federal incorpora­
tion stature. 
1 29 .  As noted earlier, rhe most widely-cited description of receivership practice is Cravarh , 
supra note 1 0 .  For an argument rhar the shift from stare ro federal courts as rhe forum of choice in 
receivership cases reflected federal judges' efforts to enhance rhe prestige of  rhe federal j udiciary, 
see Frank H .  Buckley, The American Stay, 3 So.  Cal if. Interdisc. L .J . 733 ( 1 994) .  
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The second, related factor stems from the very different impact that curbing 
Delaware's role in corporate reorganization would have on other states, as compared to 
taking s imilar action in corporate law generally. I f  Congress were to enact a federal incor­
poration statute, every state would lose i ts authority over firms incorporated in  the state. 
As a result, Delaware had a large number of potential allies in its efforts to prevent feder­
alization of corporate law. 1 30 By contrast, eliminating Delaware venue in corporate reor­
ganization would have little adverse impact on other states, s ince no other state benefitted 
from domicile-based venue. 
The importance of these factors is plain to see in the events of the 1 930s. Ideol­
ogy loomed particularly large during the 1 930s, and on federalism issues in corporate law 
rook the form of strident populist criticism of Delaware's authority over firms whose 
physical assets were centered in other states. 1 3 1 As we have seen, Delaware was able to 
preserve domicile-based venue for corporate reorganizations in 1 934 due to the happy 
accident that the principal player in the reform was a Delaware senator, Senator Daniel 
Hastings. But Senator Hastings departed in 1 936, and the New Deal reformers elimi­
nated Delaware venue (temporarily) in the second wave of reform that produced the 
Chandler Act in 1 938 .  
As always i s  the case with public choice analysis, i t  i s  far easier to provide a 
coherent explanation of the past than to offer useful predictions for the future. Neverthe­
less, our historical analysis does suggest several important lessons for the current venue 
controversy. First, as in corporate law generally, Delaware has a vested interest in attract­
ing prominent bankruptcy filings . 1 32 This interest is much more precarious than Delaware's 
stake in corporate law, however. Because bankruptcy already is regulated by Congress, 
and because other states would lose little if Delaware lost its status in corporate reorgani­
zation, it is not difficult to imagine a successful effort to eliminate domicile-based venue. 
1 30. Stated differently, every state is the state of incorporation for many small firms and 
at least a few publicly held corporations, and thus has an interest in retaining authority over these 
firms. 
1 3 1 .  See supra notes 24-3 5 and accompanying text. 
1 32 .  Just as the principal opponents of domicile-based venue are non-Delaware bank­
ruptcy judges and bankruptcy lawyers, the principal beneficiaries in Delaware are Delaware's bank­
ruptcy judges and bar. 
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Yet Senator Hastings' role i n  the early 1 930s illustrates the importance of a 
second factor - the fact that a well-placed legislator may be enough to protect Delaware's 
interests . 1 33 This seems particularly true now, since the liquidity and relative purity of the 
American securities markets has dampened the appeal of populist arguments against 
Delaware's role in corporate affairs. For now, at least, Delaware has a present-day equiva­
lent of Senator Hastings in Senator Joseph Biden, who serves on and p reviously chaired 
the Judiciary Committee. So long as Senator Biden stays on the committee, even as a 
member of  the minority, he can p robably quell venue reform. 1 34 Moreover, even o ff  the 
judiciary committee, he could perhaps protect Delaware's status so long as he remains in 
the Senate. 
Thus, venue reform seems unlikely in the near term, although this could quickly 
change in the absence o f  Senator Biden, much as the departure o f  Senator Hastings and 
rise of the Democrats transformed the landscape by the late 1 930s. In  the meantime, 
Delaware's bankruptcy judges almost certainly will temper the practices that have brought 
them under fire. As the analysis of this article makes clear, both these changes and Delaware's 
likely resilience should be seen as distinctly good news. 
1 33 .  Where, as in this context, the legislator is well placed due to his or her role on the 
relevant oversight committee, the influence is very much related to the role that the committee 
structure plays in preserving legislative bargains. Su, e.g. , Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 37;  
Barry R.  Weingast and William J .  Marshall, The IndustriaL Organization of Congress: or, Why Legis­
Latures, Like Firms, are not organized as Markets, 96 ]. Pol. Econ. 1 32 ( 1 9 88 ) .  Because the relevant 
committee, here the Judiciary Committee, serves as a gatekeeper, an influential member can pre­
vent reform from reaching the full House or Senate. 
1 34 .  As evidenced by Senator Hastings' success under these conditions in  1 934 .  
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CONCLUSION 
In concluding this analysis, I would l ike to put venue reform back into the 
larger context with which I began. As I noted at the outset of the article, so long as the 
existing corporate reorganization framework remains in place, the single most important 
variable in bankruptcy practice will be the effectiveness of bankruptcy judges . Because 
charter competition and Delaware's corporate culture will prod Delaware's judges in the 
right direction, it  would be a mistake to eliminate state of incorporation as a venue op­
tion. 
But the effect of charter competition is attenuated in a variety of ways and is 
unlikely to have a nationwide effect. In consequence, it is important to consider other 
possible inducements to judicial performance. Attractive candidates include a domicile­
only or contract choice approach to venue, or  giving bankruptcy creditors a say in the 
reappointment process; one can imagine others as well .  Even without such changes, how­
ever, the quality of bankruptcy j udges has risen noticeably in recent years, and Delaware's 
bankruptcy court is an important part of this. 
